本研究探討公司是否利用認列金融資產減損與裁決性應計項目以達到盈餘管理之目的，並探討當公司具有盈餘管理動機時，其資產減損與裁決性應計項目間之關係，是否受到公司治理機制的影響。本文以財務會計準則委員第34號公報「金融商品之會計處理準則」適用第一年（2006年）之上市、櫃公司為研究樣本，研究結果發現金融資產減損損失與裁決性應計項目間呈現負向關係，亦即當資產減損損失越大，裁決性應計項目會越小。進一步研究發現在盈餘平穩化動機下，管理當局會藉由提列金融資產減損損失及裁決性應計項目來達到淨利下修之目的。此外，本研究發現，公司具有盈餘管理（特別是盈餘平穩化）動機且公司治理機制越強時，金融資產減損損失與裁決性應計項目間的關係會由負向轉為正向。此結果顯示當公司治理機制越強時，越可以抑制盈餘管理的行為。 This paper examines whether earnings management motives affect the association between financial asset write-offs (i.e., big bath, incoming smoothing) and discretionary accruals. This study also aims to explore whether the strength of corporate governance structures affect the assoication between financial asset write-offs and discretionary accruals for firms with earnings management motives. Given that firms are required to adopt Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 34, “Accounting Treatment of Financial Instruments” in 2006, the sample consistes of all public firms listed on stock exchange market and over-the-counter excluding financial and insurance industries in the year of adoption. Empirical analyses reveal that the relationship between write-offs and discretionary accruals are significantly negative for firms with earnings management motives. Specifically, firms with income smoothing incentive tend to manage earnings downards by taking finance assets write-offs concurrently with discretionary accruals. The results document that the governance measure counters the otherwise negative association between financial asset write-offs and discretionary accruals for firms with smoothing incentive, suggesting that strong governance mechanisms could constrain the management’s discretionary behaviors.
