English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 51258/86283 (59%)
Visitors : 8023736      Online Users : 53
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/33673


    Title: 產業競爭程度對高階主管現金薪酬級距與經營績效之影響
    Other Titles: The impact of industry competitiveness on the association between top executive compensation gap and firm performance
    Authors: 阮淑芬;Juan, Shu-fen
    Contributors: 淡江大學會計學系碩士班
    洪玉舜;Hung, Yu-shun
    Keywords: 產業競爭程度;薪酬級距;公司治理機制;公司績效;Industry Competition;Pay Gap;corporate governance;Firm Performance
    Date: 2008
    Issue Date: 2010-01-11 04:25:49 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文以產業競爭程度代表不確定性,探討當產業競爭程度愈高時,表徵其外在環境之不確定性亦愈高,出資者為誘發經理人發揮較大的努力,經由提高經理人報償級距與公司績效之連結,有效解決經理人與股東間之代理問題。
    本研究期間為民國86年至民國94年,共計9年。樣本為研究期間於台灣證券交易所上市之公司。本研究主要結論彙整如下:
    一、薪酬與公司經營績效部分,總經理薪酬與會計績效呈顯著正相關;總經理薪酬與市場績效呈顯著負相關。據此,本研究結果顯示總經理薪酬的給予並非依據公司市場績效之表現,而是採用會計績效作為薪酬訂定的參考依據。
    二、當產業競爭程度高時,總經理薪酬會愈高。公司愈能付出更高的薪酬以聘請有能力之高階主管為公司帶來更大的經營績效。
    三、產業競爭程度高時,經理人薪酬級距會愈高。但本研究結果顯示第一層與第二層副總經理的薪酬級距與產業競爭程度呈負相關,不顯著。表示台灣上市公司之副總經理間薪酬並未有明顯差距存在。
    四、產業競爭程度之差異,對於不同層級之高階主管薪酬級距與公司績效連結性部分,顯示在市場競爭之情況下,總經理薪酬級距與市場績效相對於會計績效更具有連結性。另外,對於第一層與第二層副總經理之薪酬級距,顯示公司副總經理間薪酬級距與會計績效相對於市場績效反而更具有連結性
    In this paper, competition is used as a proxy for uncertainty, so that the level of industry competition represents the level of uncertainty in a company''s business environment. Investors face a problem of how to motivate the managers who represent their interests. One solution is to increase the level of linkage between firm performance and manager compensation.
    This study covers a period of nine years, from 1997-2005. The sample is all companies traded on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over the study period. The main conclusions are as follows:
    1. Pay and performance: CEO pay is shown to be significantly positively correlated with firm performance; CEO compensation is significantly negatively correlated with average performance in the sector. We conclude that the contribution of CEOs cannot be explained by sector performance, and that CEO compensation is based on measures of firm performance.
    2. Industry competition and pay: CEO pay rises with the level of industry competition. Companies facing high levels of industry competition are willing to pay high levels of industry compensation to managers with the ability to improve firm performance.
    3. Industry Competition and pay gap: In the companies studied, there was a small, non-significant negative correlation between the level of industry competition and the pay gap between the first and second ranks of vice-presidents. This result suggests that there is no significant differentiation among vice-presidents in Taiwanese public companies.
    4. Competition, pay gap, performance: for a given level of industry competition, CEO pay gap is more strongly correlated with sector performance than with firm performance. However, the pay gap between the first and second ranks of vice presidents is more strongly correlated with firm performance than with sector performance.
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系暨研究所] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    0KbUnknown236View/Open

    All items in 機構典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - Feedback