管理階層誘因與股利政策以解決公司投資代理問題

機構典藏 > College of Business and Management > Graduate Institute & Department of Accounting > Thesis > Item 987654321/33659

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/33659

Title:	管理階層誘因與股利政策以解決公司投資代理問題
Other Titles:	Managerial incentives, dividend policy and risk-taking.
Authors:	陳仁信;Chen, Jen-shin
Contributors:	淡江大學會計學系碩士班洪玉舜;Hung, Yu-shun
Keywords:	過度投資;投資不足;股票選擇權;股利政策;overinvestment;underinvestment;Managerial incentives;Dividend policy
Date:	2008
Issue Date:	2010-01-11 04:25:01 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	過去有許多的文獻在代理的架構下，探討有關公司投資決策之適當性。而發現在每一個個體均追求自我利益極大化下，管理者所採取的投資策略常存在過度投資或投資不足現象。因此，有許多研究更進一步的探討企業應採用之因應策略來有效解決投資代理問題。其中，也顯示股票選擇權獎酬計劃與股利政策確實能夠有效解決投資之代理問題。但是早期研究幾乎僅單一探討股票選擇權獎酬計劃或股利政策對投資決策的影響，卻鮮少同時探討。且過去文獻未嘗針對將投資決策、股票選擇權獎酬計劃與股利政策三者間關係，同時建立起一聯立方程式探討彼此可能潛在的內生關係。故本研究旨在以代理問題的角度，利用三階段最小平方法聯立迴歸模型，探討公司的投資決策、股票選擇權獎酬計劃與股利政策彼此之間的內生關係。本文研究結果發現，在減緩投資代理問題之機制上，CEO股票選擇權與股利政策能有效地減緩過度投資與投資不足代理問題。另外，本研究欲探討股票選擇權獎酬計劃與股利政策在減緩投資代理問題的使用工具上，是否具有相互替代或互補的關係。研究結果發現，在過度投資方面，CEO股票選擇權與股利政策兩者之間呈顯著負相關。因此，CEO股票選擇權與股利政策在降低過度投資代理問題的使用工具上具有相互替代的關係。而在投資不足方面，CEO股票選擇權與股利政策兩者之間呈顯著正相關。因此，CEO股票選擇權與股利政策在降低投資不足代理問題的使用工具上具有互補的關係。 Prior studies consider how agency problems influence managerial investment decisions. Agency problems could lead managers either into overinvestment or underinvestment. In addition, some empirical studies have investigated the impact of managerial incentive compensation or dividend policy on agency problems of investment respectively. However, managerial incentive compensation and dividend policy may jointly improve investment agency problems and thus, this study deeply investigates their relationship. Specifically, the main purpose of this study is to explore the governance implications of a firm’s CEO stock options and dividend decision in controlling overinvestment and underinvestment problem. In this study, we address the potentially endogenous relation among investment decision, managerial incentive compensation, and dividend policy by estimating a three-stage least squares regression model. To distinguish between the overinvestment and underinvestment, we subdivide the sample by Tobin’s Q (Koch and Shenoy, 1999; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1994; Broussard, Buchenroth, and Pilotte, 2004). The empirical results suggest that CEO stock options and dividend policy can mitigate a firm’s overinvestment and underinvestment problem. Moreover, we investigate the relationship between CEO stock options and dividend policy in dealing with overinvestment and underinvestment problem. We find that CEO stock options and dividend policy are negatively associated with each other, indicating they act as substitute-monitoring forces for overinvestment problem. We also find that CEO stock options and dividend policy are positively related with each other, indicating they act as complements in alleviating the underinvestment problem.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Accounting] Thesis

Files in This Item:

File	Size	Format
	0Kb	Unknown	344	View/Open

Loading...