本研究旨在探討公司治理與投資支出間之關聯性，鑒於投資支出之性質與管理者裁量權之不同，投資支出可區分為資本支出與裁決性支出，透過個別性與整體性治理機制探討公司治理與資本支出和裁決性支出之關聯性，幫助資金提供者及其他利害關係人，從不同角度觀察企業投資行為。然而，有鑒於公司治理評等之相關研究對於公司治理各構面所佔權重之決定過於主觀，因此，本研究應用結構方程模式（Structural Equation Modeling, SEM），估計各構面之結構關係以計算各公司治理構面之權重。 本研究以2000年至2003年台灣上市公司進行實證分析，結果發現公司治理與資本支出和裁決性支出呈現不同之關聯性，顯示公司治理對於不同性質之投資支出會產生不同影響；而從個別治理機制與投資支出之結果，發現個別機制之迴歸結果並不一致，無法從中得到一具體之結論，所以僅觀察局部機制無法有效了解公司投資支出行為；而從整體性公司治理指標之結果，發現台灣上市公司之公司治理機制能有效監控「過度投資」及「短視投資」之代理問題。 This paper examines the association between corporate governance and investment expenditures. Based on the nature of investment expenditures and managerial discretion, investment expenditures may be divided into the capital expenditure and discretionary expenditure. We study the association between individual governance mechanisms, comprehensive corporate governance, and investment expenditures to help stakeholders observe the behavior of the investment from different perspectives. In addition, we use Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to estimate each governance structures’ weight, instead of subjective weight in previous study. The empirical results, according to the data from year 2000 to 2003 in Taiwan security market, show that it is different associations between corporate governance, capital investment, and discretionary expenditure, corporate governance will produce different impact for each kind of investment expenditure. From the association analysis of individual indicator of corporate governance and investment, we found the results of various indicators are not in unanimity, not get a consistent conclusion; so it is unable to understand effectively that the company’ investment behavior to only observe some indicator. Finally, from the association analysis results of the comprehensive indicator of corporate governance and investment we find that corporate governance can monitor the agency problem of over-investment and myopic investment behavior effectively.
