淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/33632
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    Title: 企業風險與公司治理關聯性之研究-以利害關係人觀點分析
    Other Titles: The relationship between enterprise risk and corporate governance- analysis from the perspective of stakeholder
    Authors: 潘怡樺;Pan, I-hua
    Contributors: 淡江大學會計學系碩士班
    黃振豊;Huang, Cheng-li
    Keywords: 信用評等;公司治理;資訊揭露;Credit ratings;corporate governance,;information disclosure
    Date: 2008
    Issue Date: 2010-01-11 04:22:21 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文旨在探討我國上市上櫃公司的治理機制對企業風險之影響,企業風險為債信風險、公司系統風險、非系統風險以及權益風險,公司治理則包括三大構面:所有權結構、董事會結構與以及財務透明度及資訊揭露。藉由2005年至2006年之調查,運用迴歸模型與因素分析,檢測公司治理與企業風險之關聯性,再以債權人、投資人、握有經營權之股東以及企業之多面向觀點,分析公司治理對各風險的影響。
    實證結果發現:(一)機構投資人與內部人士持股比率與債信風險、公司系統風險、非系統風險以及權益風險呈顯著負相關,大股東持股比率與系統風險呈顯著負相關,與債信風險、非系統風險呈顯著正相關。(二)獨立董監事席次與債信風險以及權益風險顯著負相關,而董監事持股比率與債信風險呈顯著正相關。(三)財務報導品質與債信風險、公司系統風險、非系統風險以及權益風險呈顯著負相關,財務報導適時性則與債信風險、非系統風險以及權益風險呈顯著負相關。(四)若以國內資訊揭露等級替代財務報導品質與財務報導適時性做為透明度及資訊揭露的代理變數,對債信風險、非系統風險以及權益風險有顯著的影響。依據本研究實證資料顯示,良好的公司治理機制確實可以降低債權人、股東、企業以及其他利害關係人之風險。
    This paper investigates the relationship between governance attributes and credit ratings, firm systematic risk, firm-specific risk, and ROE risk. We find that firms with a greater proportion of their shares held by activist institutions and officers have lower risk of credit ratings, and lower firm systematic risk, firm-specific risk and ROE risk. And firms with a greater proportion of their shares held by blockholders have higher risk of credit ratings, lower firm systematic risk and higher firm-specific risk. Higher place of independent directors and inspectors result in lower risk of credit ratings and lower ROE risk, and greater proportion of their shares held by directors and inspectors have higher risk of credit ratings. We also find that firms reporting with higher quality have lower risk of credit ratings and lower firm systematic risk, firm-specific risk, and ROE risk, and firms reporting with higher timeliness have lower risk of credit ratings, lower firm-specific risk and ROE risk. Our results show that a firm with better governance could decrease the risk of bondholders, stockholders, enterprise and other stakeholders.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Accounting] Thesis

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