淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/33627
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    Title: 公司治理、盈餘管理與企業績效之關連性
    Other Titles: An empirical investigation of the association among corporate governance, earnings management, and business performance
    Authors: 張瑀珊;Chang, Yu-shan
    Contributors: 淡江大學會計學系碩士班
    葉金成;Yeh, Chin-chen
    Keywords: 公司治理;盈餘管理;企業績效;Corporate governance;Earnings management;Business performance
    Date: 2006
    Issue Date: 2010-01-11 04:21:47 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 過去研究大都在探討公司治理與盈餘管理或企業績效之關連性,卻較少有研究依公司治理之強度來做觀察。然近年有研究指出管理者會因企業公司治理較弱而進行對其較有利之操弄行為。故本研究為探討不同公司治理強度與盈餘管理及企業績效之關係,將我國上市高科技公司,依其各年度公司治理之強度分成強、中與弱三組進行分析,以了解在不同公司治理強度下,其與盈餘管理及企業績效間之關係是否有所不同?並間接證明我國公司治理的強度是否同時具有除弊和興利功能。實證結果顯示無論有無區分企業之公司治理強弱,皆無法有效抑制企業之盈餘管理行為;而各公司治理強弱分群皆對企業績效之權益報酬率 (ROE) 呈顯著正相關,顯示對於股東的保障是公司治理的基本要求;對於保障債權人之利息保障倍數 (IS),只有在「弱度公司治理」時呈顯著正相關,在中度和強度公司治理下皆不顯著,顯示當公司治理較弱時,企業較能顧及債權人的保障;對於企業之長期績效而言我國之「弱度公司治理」無法將其影響全部反映於當期之權益報酬率,而會有遞延ㄧ期和二期的效果存在。綜言之,即使最強之公司治理仍無法對於盈餘管理有效抑制,顯示我國公司治理之除弊功能並不彰顯,僅對於企業之績效有提升之作用。
    A number of extant studies have examined the association among corporate governance, earnings management, and business performance over the past decades. However, little academic research has been devoted to testing the levels of corporate governance. Prior studies indicated that weak corporate governance appeared to have a greater impact on the magnitude of earnings management. Accordingly, this paper is intended to explore the relationship among the differing levels of corporate governance, earnings management as well as business performance. The sample of this study consists of public limited companies (PLC) of hi-tech industry in Taiwan from 2001-2004. Based on the magnitude of corporate governance, the sample firms are classified as firms with a high level of corporate governance, firms with a medium level of corporate governance, and firms with a low level of corporate governance, respectively. Evidence of the effects of varying levels of corporate governance on earnings management and/or on corporate performance can provide insights into whether governance mechanisms are served as profit-generating and/or fraud-preventing instruments. Empirical results indicate that (1) the association of the magnitude of corporate governance and earnings management is insignificant; (2) all levels of corporate governance are significantly, positively related to the return on equity (ROE), indicating that enhancing the wealth of stockholders is perceived as an indispensable part of corporate governance; (3) the relationship between the low level of corporate governance and the interest coverage ratio (IS) is significantly positive, implying that the lower the level of corporate governance, the less likely managers will engage in some activities that transfer wealth from bondholders; (4) weak corporate governance in the current year appears to have a significant impact on ROE in the subsequent one to two years. Overall, the findings suggest that the implementation of corporate governance does not effectively lessen the magnitude of earnings management. Specifically, the implication is that the hi-tech companies in Taiwan utilize corporate governance to enhance business performance rather than prevent the incidence of financial fraud.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Accounting] Thesis

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