本研究以中國的上市公司為研究對象，探討經濟狀況和債務條件對應計項目模型的影響。在探討經濟狀況對模型的影響發現，中國企業提列應計項目時，企業會更快速的認列利得，與Ball and Shivakumar (2006)以美國公司為研究對象時，發現企業會更穩健的認列損失（更快速的認列損失）有所不同，此一結果的差異，可能是因為中國和美國法律環境的不同所致，由於中國的法律環境對投資人的保護較不完善，因此，企業有更多的誘因，利用應計項目來調升公司的盈餘。此外，本研究進一步的瞭解，不同的債務條件下（債務環境較佳與債務環境較差），企業不對稱的認列利得或損失的情況，是否存在差異，結果顯示，中國市場上，債務條件較差的企業相較於債務條件較佳的企業，更會利用應計項目來增加盈餘。本研究亦以台灣之上市櫃公司，探討相同的現象，發現台灣企業會較為保守的認列應計項目（更快速的認列損失），且在債務條件較差的公司，此一現象更為明顯，與Ball and Shivakumar (2006)的發現相同，此一結果，可能是因為台灣的法律，對投資人保護較為完善所致。 This paper examines the role of contract conditions and economic conditions (economic gains and losses) within the Chinese stock market, with the results of the accruals models indicating that firms in China demonstrate more timely recognition of gains than losses. This result differs significantly from the findings of Ball and Shivakumar (2006) who similarly examined the U.S. firms, with such disparity possibly arising from differences in the legal environments of China and the US. We also separate the sample into two groups (better or worse debt contract conditions) to determine whether this asymmetric recognition of accruals by firms is affected by their debt contract condition. The results reveal that firms in China with a worse debt contract condition have much greater incentives to use accruals to hide their economic losses than firms with a better debt contract condition; that is, firms with a worse debt contract condition have greater incentives to gloss over their financials in the Chinese securities market, a market within which the securities laws remain immature. In addition, we also explore the similar relations in Taiwan securities market and find that firms in Taiwan demonstrate more timely recognition of losses than gains; furthermore, in Taiwan the firms with worse debt contract condition have much greater incentives to timelier recognize their economic losses than the firms with a better debt contract condition; that is, firms with a worse debt contract condition have greater incentives to conservatism recognize accruals.
