淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/32973
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    題名: Relationships among budgetary leadership style, managerial budgeting games, and budgetary attitudes
    其他題名: 預算領導風格、經理人之預算博弈與預算態度關聯性之研究
    作者: 陳敏齡;Chen, Mien-ling
    貢獻者: 淡江大學管理科學研究所博士班
    黃振豊;Huang, Cheng-li
    關鍵詞: 預算領導風格;預算博弈;預算態度;Budgetary leadership style;budgeting games;budgetary attitudes
    日期: 2009
    上傳時間: 2010-01-11 03:04:22 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 預算是企業經營上一項重要的管理工具之一。在預算編製過程中,經理人提出其預算需求,上司則依經理人提案的目標來分配資源。然而在有限的資源情況下,經理深怕預算被削減,即可能使用一系列的預算博弈來取得其所想要的預算額度。本研究目的除了探討上司預算領導風格(權變報酬vs.權變懲罰)、經理人預算博弈(迂迴型vs.經濟型)與預算態度間的關係。另外一個研究焦點是檢測:是否不同的人口統計變項使用預算博弈會一樣? 本研究以上市(櫃)公司之經理人為研究對象,採問卷調查法進行,並以結構方程模型以及排序普羅比模型分析。受訪者大部分為製造業之財會經理人員。研究結果顯示,上司權變報酬領導風格對經理人預算過程態度有直接和正面的影響,且經理人較易使用經濟型預算博弈,並對預算過程態度間接產生正面影響。另外, 上司權變懲罰領導風格對經理人預算過程態度不會有直接的影響效果,但經理人較易採行迂迴型預算博弈,並對預算過程態度間接產生負面影響,特別是非財會經理人員。經理人使用經濟型之預算博弈有正面的預算過程態度,反而是經理人使用迂迴型之預算博弈,有負面的預算過程態度。此外,經理人使用迂迴型博弈會因性別、階級以及是否為財會經理人而有不同。特別是財會經理人較非財會經理人較不會使用迂迴型預算博弈。本研究結果有助於管理者瞭解台灣在編製預算時有效的領導風格,以及不同統計變項的經理人是如何使用預算博弈取得其預算資源。
    Budgeting is a management tool in business operations. In the budget-preparation process, managers propose their budgets and superiors, based on the objectives of the projects, allocate resources to the managers. However, due to limited resources, managers are afraid that budget is cut. Therefore, these managers may play budgeting games to obtain their desired budget requests.
    The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships among budgetary leadership style (contingent reward vs. contingent punishment), budgeting games (devious games vs. economic games), and attitudes towards the budgetary process. An additional focus of this study was to examine whether different demographic characteristics employ budgeting games similarly? A survey questionnaire was selected. Structural equation models and an ordered probit analysis were used to analyze the data gathered from 216 managers in listed companies. The majority of respondents were accounting/finance managers employed by manufacturing firms.
    Results reveal that contingent-reward leadership style has a direct and positive effect on attitudes toward the budgetary process, and an indirect effect through economic games. On the other hand, we find evidence that contingent-punishment leadership style has only an indirect and negative effect on attitudes toward the budgetary process through devious games, especially for non-accounting/finance managers. Managers who play economic games tend to have positive attitudes towards the budgetary process, while those who play devious games do not. In addition, managers play devious games differently by gender, hierarchical rank and accounting/finance mangers or not. Especially accounting/finance managers are less likely to employ devious games to obtain their budget request than other managers do.
    The findings should be useful to management in understanding what effective leadership style is in the budget-preparation process in Taiwan, and assessing how budgeting games are likely to be adopted by different demographic characteristics of managers in Taiwan.
    顯示於類別:[管理科學學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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