Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Other Titles: ||Electronic commerce, network externalities and sales tax|
|Authors: ||蔡佩宜;Tsai, Pei-yi|
|Keywords: ||電子商務;網路外部性;銷售稅;Electronic commerce;network externalities;Sales tax|
|Issue Date: ||2010-01-11 02:13:35 (UTC+8)|
This research investigates the influence of taxation of electronic commerce on efficiency and welfare, especially the indirect taxation under a sales tax of purchases via the Internet which is characterized by the existence of network externalities. We adopt partial equilibrium approach, based respectively on duopoly and monopoly models with network externalities, which affect both demand and supply, to derive demand function(s), the optimal strategies of firm(s), market equilibrium(s) and the stipulation of optimal sales tax, when products may sell on electronic channel and traditional channel at the same time. We find that, as long as the government takes tax revenue into account, sales tax should be imposed, irrespectively of purchasing channels. The important conclusions are: (1) to pursue the social welfare maximum, the government should not impose sales tax on either local or remote purchases of final goods and services; and (2) to raise maximal tax revenue or to maximize social welfare under the restriction of tax revenue, commodities purchased through Internet should be taxed at lower sales tax rate to reduce harmful effects on network externalities. On the impact on the efficiency of allocation, regardless of the goal of levying taxes, sales tax will reduce output and price simultaneously so that the profits of firm(s) and consumer’s surplus both decline, and thus the social welfare is worsened. In addition, if the difference between the investment cost and the saving of overhead expenses and production cost caused by engaging in e-commerce is small enough, then in the duopoly market, the firm which exists originally in the traditional channel will choose to join e-commerce finally; the monopolist will offer a single electronic channel to consumers in order to pursue profits maximum.
|Appears in Collections:||[經濟學系暨研究所] 學位論文|
All items in 機構典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.