資料載入中.....
|
請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件:
https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/32487
|
| 題名: | 電子商務、網路外部性與銷售稅 |
| 其他題名: | Electronic commerce, network externalities and sales tax |
| 作者: | 蔡佩宜;Tsai, Pei-yi |
| 貢獻者: | 淡江大學經濟學系碩士班
江莉莉;Jiang, Lily |
| 關鍵詞: | 電子商務;網路外部性;銷售稅;Electronic commerce;network externalities;Sales tax |
| 日期: | 2005 |
| 上傳時間: | 2010-01-11 02:13:35 (UTC+8) |
| 摘要: | 本研究主要是探討當網際網路的使用存在著消費與生產的外部性時，對電子商務課徵銷售稅的效率影響與福利效果。採用部分均衡分析法，以具有網路外部性的雙占與獨占二種市場模型為基礎，探討產品分別在電子通路與傳統通路銷售時，消費者與廠商的決策、市場均衡，以及最適銷售稅的訂定。本文發現，只要政府有稅收的考量，無論是傳統市場的交易或電子商務都應課徵銷售稅；重要結論如下：(1)若政府為追求社會福利最大，則不應課徵銷售稅；(2)若政府是基於稅收之目的或是在特定稅收下追求社會福利最大，則應對網路外部性較大的電子通路訂定較低的稅率。在銷售稅對效率與分配的影響方面，無論課稅目標為何，銷售稅的課徵都將使得產量減少，市場價格降低。同時，廠商的利潤與消費者剩餘均減少，從而社會福利降低。此外，若電子商務的投入成本與成本節省的差額夠小，則在雙占市場中，原本存在於傳統通路的廠商最終將選擇加入電子商務；而獨占廠商為追求利潤最大，也會提供一個單一的電子通路給消費者。
This research investigates the influence of taxation of electronic commerce on efficiency and welfare, especially the indirect taxation under a sales tax of purchases via the Internet which is characterized by the existence of network externalities. We adopt partial equilibrium approach, based respectively on duopoly and monopoly models with network externalities, which affect both demand and supply, to derive demand function(s), the optimal strategies of firm(s), market equilibrium(s) and the stipulation of optimal sales tax, when products may sell on electronic channel and traditional channel at the same time. We find that, as long as the government takes tax revenue into account, sales tax should be imposed, irrespectively of purchasing channels. The important conclusions are: (1) to pursue the social welfare maximum, the government should not impose sales tax on either local or remote purchases of final goods and services; and (2) to raise maximal tax revenue or to maximize social welfare under the restriction of tax revenue, commodities purchased through Internet should be taxed at lower sales tax rate to reduce harmful effects on network externalities. On the impact on the efficiency of allocation, regardless of the goal of levying taxes, sales tax will reduce output and price simultaneously so that the profits of firm(s) and consumer’s surplus both decline, and thus the social welfare is worsened. In addition, if the difference between the investment cost and the saving of overhead expenses and production cost caused by engaging in e-commerce is small enough, then in the duopoly market, the firm which exists originally in the traditional channel will choose to join e-commerce finally; the monopolist will offer a single electronic channel to consumers in order to pursue profits maximum. |
| 顯示於類別: | [經濟學系暨研究所] 學位論文
|
文件中的檔案:
| 檔案 |
大小 | 格式 | 瀏覽次數 |
|---|
| 0Kb | Unknown | 342 | 檢視/開啟 |
|
在機構典藏中所有的資料項目都受到原著作權保護.
|
