本文利用成本差異、Cournot競爭的架構，分別從權利金收益及社會福利的角度，探討降幅型研發與非降幅型研發下，產業外研發單位的最適授權機制。可能的授權方式有三：次高價格密價拍賣、固定權利金與單位權利金。 本文發現，如果產業外研發單位以權利金收益為考量，最適授權方式難以從一而論；基本上要依成本的降幅、授權前成本差異的程度而定。非降幅型研發若能改善所有廠商的成本，則最適授權方式為次高價格密價拍賣，但若只能改善技術劣勢廠商的位成本，則最適授權方式為固定權利金。 如果以社會福利為考量，不論是降幅型或非降幅型研發，只要能改善所有廠商的成本，最適授權方式都是固定權利金；但若非降幅型研發只能改善技術劣勢廠商的成本，則最適授權方式為單位權利金。 This article studies the optimal licensing mechanism of an outside patent-holder from a point of view of the patent-holder’s profit or social welfare, in a cost differentiated、Cournot duopoly model. We consider two types of cost reducing innovation: “cost-cut” and “non cost-cut”; and three types of patent licensing: second-price sealed-bid auction, fixed-fee franchising or royalty. With the view of maximizing the patent-holder’s profit, it is found that the optimal licensing policy of cost-cut innovation varies with the degree of cost differentiation and the extent of cost-cut. The optimal licensing policy of non cost-cut innovation improving all firms’ cost is second-price sealed-bid auction, but the optimal licensing policy is fixed-fee if the non cost-cut innovation can only improve the cost of the less efficient firm. To maximize social welfare, the optimal licensing policy is fixed-fee if the innovation can improve all firms’ cost no matter whether it is cost-cut or non cost-cut innovation. However the optimal licensing policy is royalty if the non cost-cut innovation improves only the cost of the less efficient firm.
