| 摘要: | 自1997年亞洲金融風暴後，世界各國的企業陸續發生各種弊端而造成財務危機，其發展影響全世界之資本市場甚鉅，也使得「公司治理」機制受到世界各國的重視。有鑑於金融產業是各國經濟發展之重要基礎，係法律架構大於消費者導向，其產業等性有別於一般產業，理應有更健全的公司治理機制。本研究以經濟暨合作發展組織之公司治理原則、世界銀行之公司治理架構與國內外公司治理相關實證文獻作為理論基礎，從台灣金融控股公司之法律架構切入，嘗試建構一套適合衡量台灣企業之公司治理評等指標。
透過分析量化之公司層級衡量指標，依循台灣所發展出之公司治理評等系統，考量金融產業特性後，決定公司治理評等構面與衡量指標，透過量化的公司治理變數－股權結構、董事會組成結構、管理型態及大股東介入股市程度等構面，找出其對公司價值之影響性，尋找影響金融控股公司之關鍵性指標，以提供後續發展對建構完整之公司治理評等系統之參考。
本研究以2004年至2005年間之金融控股公司為對象。探討公司治理四個主要構面，董監事結構、股權結構、管理型態及大股東介入股市與經營績效之關聯性，以供作為制定公司治理機制之參考。本研究實證結果如下：
公司治理構面中以大股東介入股市對經營績效有顯著影響，且對經營績效為負向影響，而董事會組成結構、管理型態、股權結構對公司績效的關聯性則並不顯著。顯示股權質押比例愈高，公司產生財務危機的可能性愈高，與公司價值呈現負向關係。同時也顯示，公司績效的提昇不在於獨立董監席次的多寡，也不在於大股東擔任董事比率的高低，而在於董監事及經營階層是否直誠信，不會因為私利而影響公益，以發揮內部稽核的功能，且部分實證也顯示大股東本身即為良好的監督者。
而在股權結構方面，我國金控公司經營績效與董監事持股比例、外資持股比例之關係並不顯著，顯然「利益收斂假說」學說現象並不存在，股權愈集中於董監事手中，不必然會使管理績效提昇。且股權愈集中，對金控公司的價值與績效不必然有正面影響，大股東能否成為良好的監督者，仍需視大股東本身的道德操守而定。
同時，經本研究實證結果也發現，公司治理綜合指標之分數愈高，公司績效不必然就較好。顯然公司治理綜合指標並非衡量公司價值之絕對指標。此外，由於金融控股公司法於2001年11月才實施，限於樣本數及樣本期間較少，無法做進一步之堅韌性測試，以發展完整之公司治理評等系統。綜而言之，欲提昇公司之經營績效，除確實推動內部控制制度，還要有正直誠信的企業領導人及董監事，才能真正發揮公司治理機制的內部功能。
Since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the frequency of financial crises outbreaks around the world have influenced the movements of global capital markets. In response, great importance has been placed upon the establishment of related corporate governance mechanisms by developed nations. Seeing that the banking industry is an important foundation for the economic development of every nation, with unique characteristics different than general consumer-oriented businesses, the development and implementation of comprehensive and reliable corporate governance measures and mechanisms has become a critically important task.
Based on principles proposed by OECD, a framework provided by the World Bank and empirical literature on corporate governance, and integrating the fundamental corporate governance theories that underlying the current legal framework of the Financial Holding Company Act in Taiwan, this research paper attempts to develop a workable Taiwan Corporate Governance Index ranking system.
According to the circulation of the review systems developed in Taiwan for corporate
governance, and indices of characteristic variables for the banking industry, this study
discusses the relationship between operation performance from four perspectives of
corporate governance consisting of the structure of directors and supervisors, the
structure of ownership, the structure of management, and the structure of degree
of influence exerted upon the stock market by major shareholders. It is hoped that given
these characteristic variables for the banking industry, the degree of influence on
corporate value can be sought out. The influence of the key index of Taiwan financial
holding companies was sought in order to supply follow-up development concerning the
establishment of structural and legal operational norms for Taiwan financial holding
companies as well as a reference for the establishment of a complete reviewing system
for corporate governance. Our empirical results are summarized as follows:
Our research revealed that corporate operational performance was most influenced
by the degree of stock market influence or interference exerted by major shareholders.
And that more often than not such influence has a negative impact on operational
Performance. In contrast, the relationships between operational performance and
structure of directors and supervisors, the structure of ownership, and the structure
of management type were weak. First of all, a higher pledge ratio may indicate a higher
financial crisis. In other words, there is negative relationship between a company’s
pledge ratios and corporate value. Second, our research shows that enhancement of
operational performance depended less on the number of independent directors and
supervisors and the percentage of directors served by block holders, but more on the
honesty and integrity of directors, supervisors and management who value the
public/corporate interest above their own interests and who proactively implement
comprehensive internal audit and control systems.
With respect to the structure of ownership of Taiwan financial holding companies,the
relationship between operational performance and the stock holding ratios of directors
and supervisors and foreign investors was weak. Our research showed that the
“Convergence of Interest Hypothesis” or “Efficient monitoring Hypothesis” do not
apply. The fact that stock ownership is more concentrated does not seem to produce
positive effects on the value and performance of Financial Holding Companies. The
question of whether block holders are good monitors seems depend on the morality of block
holders.
Furthermore, our studies showed that the higher a financial holding company scored on the CGI (Corporate Governance Index) did not produce a corresponding gain on the
company’s performance or value. It appears that CGI is not an absolute index to evaluate
corporate value. In addition, because financial holding company laws went into effect
in November of 2001, not enough usable information has been provided, and it is impossible
to go a step further and do solid tests to develop a complete corporate governance review
system for financial holding companies. In short, to improve the corporate operational
results appears to require, among other things, fully integrated comprehensive internal
audit and internal control systems and corporate leaders, as well as the directors and
supervisors, with the vision and commitment to ensure that the positive functions of
corporate governance will be carried out,. |
