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    Title: 廠商於風險下的策略性投資行為
    Other Titles: Firm's strategic investment behavior under risky
    Authors: 林冠谷;Lin, Gran-gue
    Contributors: 淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士班
    王光正;林俊宏
    Keywords: 寡佔市場;策略性效果;Stackelberg領導者;Cournot數量競爭;Oligopoly market;Strategic effect;Stackelberg leader;Cournot Competition
    Date: 2008
    Issue Date: 2010-01-11 02:01:20 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文主要是探討於寡佔市場中,廠商在面對景氣的風險下,藉由投資產能所產生的策略性效果。廠商在對手決定產量前設置產能可以使自己成為Stackelberg領導者,甚至可以阻礙對手進入市場。本文首先探討在對手廠商無固定成本下廠商的產能投資行為,我們的結論是當景氣的風險增加,廠商會逐漸減少產能的設置而傾向於景氣顯現之後依實際的景氣水準與對手進行Cournot數量競爭,且單位產能投資成本增加也會有相同的效果。其次我們探討在對手廠商有固定成本下廠商透過設置產能阻卻對手進入市場的投資行為,我們發現當單位產能成本提高,由於會使廠商生產獨占產量較具策略優勢,因此廠商將傾向設置獨占產能阻卻對手進入市場。當風險提高,由於會使廠商生產阻卻進入產量較具策略優勢,因此廠商將傾向設置阻卻進入產能阻卻對手進入市場。
    The purpose of my thesis is to describe the firm’s investing behavior under demand with uncertainty. We set up a 2-stage game;in stage 1, the incumbent firm decides its output capacity before the competitor entries into the market, in stage 2, the incumbent firm and its competitor engage in Cournot competition. There are two parts in this thesis. We discuss the incumbent firm’s investing behavior when the competitor has no fixed cost in the fist part, and the major conclusion of this part is that when the risky of climate increases, the firm will decrease to set the output capacity and prefer to join Cournot competition by the real level of climate. when marginal cost of investment increases, the firm will also decrease to set the output capacity. And we discuss the incumbent firm’s investing behavior when the competitor has fixed cost in the second part, and the major conclusion of this part is that when the risky of climate increases, the firm will prefer to set deter-entry capacity to prevent the competitor from entering market, or when marginal cost of investment increases, the firm will prefer to set monopoly capacity to prevent the competitor from entering market.
    Appears in Collections:[保險學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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