傷害險之資訊不對稱問題及銀行通路的影響

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 風險管理與保險學系 > 學位論文 > Item 987654321/32349

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题名:	傷害險之資訊不對稱問題及銀行通路的影響
其它题名:	The asymmetric information problems in accident insurance market and the influence of bancassurance channel.
作者:	黃淑惠;Huang, Shu-hui
贡献者:	淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士在職專班汪琪玲;Wang, Kili C.
关键词:	傷害險;資訊不對稱;銀行保險;accident insurance;Asymmetric Information;Bancassurance
日期:	2009
上传时间:	2010-01-11 02:01:08 (UTC+8)
摘要:	產險公司經營傷害險多以擴大業務為經營策略，以業績成長為經營重點，為了快速讓傷害險成長，都以多元行銷通路為快捷之考量，而近幾年來，銷售通路上多採取與銀行、保險經紀人或代理人合作。由於銀行保險通路漸漸成為保險公司保險產品行銷的重要管道，研究這個通路形成的影響，對保險公司是一個相當重要的議題。本文觀察銀行保險通路，對於傷害險這樣一種單純、且保險公司針對個人特性變數控制不多的險種，是否提供另一層對個人風險特性的篩選作用，所以，本文旨在研究產險公司於銀行保險通路銷售傷害險，保單訊息不對稱問題的程度，是否與來自其他通路的保單有所不同。本文除針對某產險公司所有銷售通路售出之傷害險保單全樣本進行分析外，更進一步將全樣本分成銀行、及非銀行通路兩個子樣本，比較這兩個子樣本上，是否有不同程度之訊息不對稱。實證結果，在傷害險市場上，個人購買保單保障高低與是否出險間的相關係數發現，所有通路及非銀行通路的傷害險市場上，存在有利選擇的現象；但在銀行通路上，卻可看出逆選擇或道德危險之訊息不對稱問題，比其他通路嚴重。若想清楚保險公司在保單銷售上的利潤狀態，僅比較購買高保障機率與出險機率，似乎不夠，還有待進一步觀察出險金額、與保障選擇機率間的關係。在觀察出險金額、與保障選擇機率間的關係上，發現在所有通路全體樣本，雖然傷害險市場的高保障保單、出險機率雖低，可是一旦出險、出險金額卻偏高，在銀行通路銷售的保單上，更是如此。所以，在銀行通路上出售的保單，不但高保障保單有較高的出險機率、且出險時的出險金額顯著較高，這就是讓銀行通路出售之保單損失率較高的原因。 Abstract： The strategy of property insurance company of broadening scope of accident insurance is by increasing the volume of insurance policies. In order to boost the volume in a short time, most of insurance companies utilize multi-channel strategy. Cooperating with banks or insurance brokerage companies is a main stream to run business. As banks are proved to be one of the important channel of insurance company, it is important issue for insurance company to study the influence of this channel which took into shape recently. This research observes that channel of bank (ie, banc assurance) ,whether provide another screening function of individual characteristic, in term of uncomplicated and low variable factors of accident insurance. Therefore, this research is for survey whether the degree of asymmetrical information of selling accident insurance by banc assurance is different from by others channel. Besides analyzing accident insurance policies sold by all channels of a certain property insurance company, this research further dividing those samples into the channels of bank and non-bank as two sub-samples and making a comparison if there is vary degree of asymmetrical information. The result shows that it exists advantage of making choice for the accident insurance from all channel and non-bank channel in term of the relative coefficient between the covered accident ratio and accident occurrence; As for Banc assurance ,it is much more serious than others channel on Asymmetric Information in term of moral hazard and adverse selection. If we like to clarify the profit of insurance policy, it is not enough to compare the covered accident ratio and the probability of accident occurrence. To observe the relationship between the amount of indemnification and the choice of covered accidents is still needed to be followed. To monitor samples from all channels in term of the relationship of the amount of indemnification and the choice of covered accidents, even the rate of accident occurrence for the high covered accident insurance policy is low, the indemnification is pretty high once the accident occurred, especially for those policies sold by banks. Not only for high accident occurrence in policy with high covered accidents but also for high indemnification once accident occurs, which is the main reason for high lossratio for the policy sold by bank.
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