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    Title: 以賽局模型對特定假設條件下產險業競爭行為之研究
    Other Titles: The research of the competitive behavior about non-life insurance company in game theory model under specific conditions
    Authors: 林宗義;Lin, Chung-yi
    Contributors: 淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士在職專班
    郝充仁;Hao, Chung-jen
    Keywords: 產險市場;競爭;殺價;賽局;產險業;non-life;insurance market;competitive;game;price
    Date: 2006
    Issue Date: 2010-01-11 01:53:44 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 我國產險業發展至今,彼此間的競爭愈趨激烈,個別產險公司為獲取業務最常被採取的競爭方式是「殺價」。即使因殺價過低或重大損失發生造成虧損,短期內會將保險費率拉回應有水準,不過一旦業者認為殺價有利可圖,仍會再度採取殺價之競爭方式。
    究竟是什麼樣的決策過程,促使產險業者認為殺價是有利於己的決策,本論文利用「完全訊息靜態賽局」根據各項假設進行模型分析,探究業者之所以會採取殺價措施之決策過程。分析中發現由於個別業者均認為殺價有利於己,因而採取殺價策略,當市場上所有業者均採取殺價策略時,誰也無法從殺價過程中獲利,反倒是殺價後使市值減少,個別業者的保費收入也跟者減少,殺價策略成為一種迷思。本論文也就此一迷思之所以存在,探討其所具備不得不然之矛盾因素。
    從模型分析中發現,市場上業者家數愈多、業者間市佔率差異愈大則殺價情形會愈嚴重,但業者若能做好「客戶關係管理」則殺價情況將獲改善。並利用模型來解釋為何「同業協定」不容易維持、並探討市場的殺價底限。
    為求進一步分析影響產險市場之殺價因素,本論文探討了自留比率高低及再保市場嚴峻或寬鬆,如何影響個別業者願意殺價之底限;國內保險業最低資本額之規定是否加劇了產險市場的競爭;產險業之產業特性是否早已避免不了殺價的宿命;差別取價或許是產險業不至於因殺價而陷入絕境之重要原因;同為保險業的人身保險業,為何不如產險業有著如此嚴重之殺價情形。
    最後本論文利用模型分析與殺價之影響因素所探討之結果,建議政府有關單位與業者採取若干措施以改善國內產險市場殺價之情形。
    The competition between the non-life insurance companies is getting worse day by day in Taiwan. In order to get more business, the most usual way they take is “Reduce their own price”. When it causes a deficit due to over reducing their own price or there are some great losses from the clients, they adjust their price back to the normal level. But after that, the strategy will be taken again as soon as they feel there is any chance to make profits.
    What decision-making procedures made it happen? This thesis will analyze it by using “Strategic form Games” based on a variety of hypothetic models to find out the reason. From this analysis we found out that the company who adopts the reducing price strategy thought it is helpful for premium increasing, but when everyone from the market is using the same strategy, the premium income is decreased in final. The result is decreasing the insurance premium income following by the whole market value shrieked. This strategy becomes a delusion that will also be discussed by analyzing the existence of the conflicts.
    After studying the model we found out that the more companies in the market or the more different market sharing among companies will lead to the more serious situation, but the situation will be improved if the company has good “Customer Relationship Management”. I also use the model to explain why the agreement between the companies is uneasy to keep and research the bottom price line of the market.
    For more further analyzing the factors of the strategy will influence the market, this dissertation research the percentage of Retention, the loose of the Re-insurance market, and how they affect the price reducing bottom line from each individual company; whether the Minimum Capital requirement is increasing the competition in the non-life insurance market; the reducing price is an inevitable nature of this business; the Price Discrimination maybe is the important reason the business is not going to the dead end; why the life insurance market can still keep its price level steady.
    Finally we hope the Government and the non-life insurance companies will take our suggestions from the outcome of this thesis to improve the situation.
    Appears in Collections:[保險學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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