淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/32035
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    题名: 高價電子股、員工分紅配股費用化V.S.貪婪度
    其它题名: High price electronic stock, expense of stock grants v.s. greediness
    作者: 林佳吟;Lin, Jia-yin
    贡献者: 淡江大學國際貿易學系國際企業學碩士班
    賴錦璋;Lai, Chin-chang
    关键词: 高價電子股;員工分紅配股費用化;貪婪心態;Stock Grant’s Expense;High Price Electronic Stocks;different imputed price
    日期: 2009
    上传时间: 2010-01-11 01:34:13 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 隨著我國資本市場日漸成熟以及股票市揚的蓬勃發展,國內科技業者藉由盈餘轉增資配發股票作為主要紅利已經為普遍現象,國內員工分紅配股費用化措施自2008年1月1日起實施,即針對從2007年盈餘在從事員工分紅配股時,配股必須予以費用化處理。本文透過不同的計價方式,觀察國內上市、櫃高價電子業者在員工分紅配股實施前後的這段期間所呈現的貪婪心態上的變化。

    本研究透過個年度及跨年度的整體面及逐項面指標,來剖析上市、櫃高價電子股從事員工分紅配股時,所展現的貪婪程度;在不同計價方式下,掌控員工分紅配股費用化後對企業獲利所造成之侵蝕;暨逐年觀察上市、櫃高價電子公司所展現的貪婪心態上之變化,並比較究竟何者會呈現較為貪婪的風貌。最後,嘗試探究國內上市、櫃高價電子業者在確定有白吃的午餐的同時,是否會抱著混水摸魚大撈一筆的心態;在確定白吃的午餐不存在時,是否會逐漸收斂貪婪的態度。

    實證結果與分析後發現,不論就整體面與逐項面,抑或是上市對上櫃高價電子業者而言,在員工分紅配股費用化實施前的空窗期,呈現出要發就大肆發放的結論;而在員工分紅配股費用化制度確立,上市、櫃高價電子業者貪婪程度有逐漸收斂的趨勢。此外,就上市、櫃高價電子公司而言,其中又以上市高價電子公司較為貪婪。
    Since the capital market became mature, and the stock market boomed in Taiwan, electronic companies offering stock grants have become a general phenomenon. Because all stock grants should be treated as expenses from January 1, 2008. In our lecture, we will utilize different imputed price to analyze the behaviors of high-price electronic companies in the execution of stock grants. We will compare the outcomes from recent three years, and utilize integral views and different specific indicators to inspect the effects on high-price electronic companies’ greediness behind stock grants. Moreover, we will observe the transformation of high-price electronic companies’ greediness. Finally, we want to know: should they tap the opportunity to become greedier in free lunch time, or should they converge the greediness after expense of stock grants.

    According to the empirical results, we find same tendency in listed and OTC high-price electronic companies’ behavior, in both even through integral views and different specific indicators. Those high-price companies grant stock bonuses become greedier in the free lunch time. We find once expense of stock bonuses is implemented, there are more listed and OTC high-price electronic companies have converged their greediness. Besides, in the recent three years, we find that high-price electronic companies in the Listed market were more generous to grant stock bonuses than in the OTC.
    显示于类别:[國際企業學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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