實證結果與分析後發現，不論就整體面與逐項面，抑或是上市對上櫃高價電子業者而言，在員工分紅配股費用化實施前的空窗期，呈現出要發就大肆發放的結論；而在員工分紅配股費用化制度確立，上市、櫃高價電子業者貪婪程度有逐漸收斂的趨勢。此外，就上市、櫃高價電子公司而言，其中又以上市高價電子公司較為貪婪。 Since the capital market became mature, and the stock market boomed in Taiwan, electronic companies offering stock grants have become a general phenomenon. Because all stock grants should be treated as expenses from January 1, 2008. In our lecture, we will utilize different imputed price to analyze the behaviors of high-price electronic companies in the execution of stock grants. We will compare the outcomes from recent three years, and utilize integral views and different specific indicators to inspect the effects on high-price electronic companies’ greediness behind stock grants. Moreover, we will observe the transformation of high-price electronic companies’ greediness. Finally, we want to know: should they tap the opportunity to become greedier in free lunch time, or should they converge the greediness after expense of stock grants.
According to the empirical results, we find same tendency in listed and OTC high-price electronic companies’ behavior, in both even through integral views and different specific indicators. Those high-price companies grant stock bonuses become greedier in the free lunch time. We find once expense of stock bonuses is implemented, there are more listed and OTC high-price electronic companies have converged their greediness. Besides, in the recent three years, we find that high-price electronic companies in the Listed market were more generous to grant stock bonuses than in the OTC.
