當銀行經理人對股東權益報酬的風險認知，是屬於相對高風險的狀態下，透過金融管理當局增加資本管制，將導致銀行最適利差增加，因此得知，提高資本管制不但可使銀行獲利增加，進而達到金融穩定的效果。而當銀行有能力同時決定市場的存放款利率時，在策略性替代下，銀行將會降低存款利率，達到獲利增加的效果。 This paper demonstrates how labor voice and capital regulation jointly determine the bank’s optimal interest margin decision. Our theoretical model is based on a regime giving corporate governance power to current labor and then labor’s objective is equivalent to minimizing the equity value of the put option. Our model show that an increase in the labor voice in corporate governance decreases the bank’s optimal interest margin in the put-option valuation when the bank realizes a relatively less risky state of the world. Labor shouldn’t interfere with bank’s strategy.
However, our model also shows that an increase in the capital-to-deposits ratio increases the bank’s optimal interest margin when the bank realizes a relatively more risky state. Enhancing capital regulation can achieve finance stable.
