In the international competitive environment, the economic and trade policies of various countries often have mutual influence. But international policies are also influenced by the factors, such as political culture, international relations, economic and trade background, etc... This research tries to analyse this decision-making process and result with the inter-dynamic of economic and trade policies of China and the United States. And, then we join Taiwan as a parameter of influence of policy remuneration of two countries, and analyse further whether the decision-making process still has the consistency, and the impact on China and the United States.
Thus far, the government of China''s Mainland has adopted the multiple measures of conducts, involving the steady monetary policies and the tightened financial policies, attempting to control the economic growth rate since the second half of 2003. It turns out overheated, and expected to be able to come to the long term target “soft-land”. In addition, the global boom intensifies gradually, and the inflation pressure is cumulative. The Federal Reserve Board has begun a series of actions of raising the discount rate gradually since June 30 of 2004, gone through 17 times and improved the federal fund interest rate from 1% of the historical low point to present 5.25%.
Take a broad view of the economic and trade inter-dynamic characteristic of policies between two countries, while both sides are all with the assumption of rational expectation and maximizing their payoffs in the future, this research develops a multi-stage game theoretical model to verify similarities and differences of the theory and real example. This research also sums up 4 the following conclusions: （1）According to view of China, macroeconomic adjustments and controls is the dominant strategy. （2）According to view of U.S.A., the tightening monetary policy is a dominant strategy. （3）No matter joining Taiwan as a parameter of influence of the game payoffs or not, the equilibrium of game is consistent in converging to the upper left corner. （4）The equilibrium of game falls into Prisoner ,s Dilemma. Both sides are under the long-term and repeated way, and still unwilling to cooperate because of fearing to be betrayed by the other side, raising the remuneration of both sides.