| 摘要: | 在國際競爭環境中，各國的經貿政策往往具有相互的影響性，然而兩國之間的各項政策，亦受政治文化、國際關係、經貿背景等因素所影響。本文藉由中美兩國經貿政策的互動，試著分析此一決策過程與結果，而後再加入台灣作為影響兩國政策報酬的變數，進一步分析決策過程是否仍具一致性，及對中美雙方的影響。
2003年下半年迄今，中國大陸政府採行多項措施，涉及穩健收斂的財政政策與緊縮的貨幣政策，試圖控制經濟的成長幅度，使景氣不至於過熱，期望能使大陸經濟成長達成「軟著陸」的目標。此外，由於全球景氣逐漸升溫，物價膨脹壓力漸增，因此自2004年6月30日起美國開始一連串逐漸升息的動作，歷經16次升息而將聯邦基金利率從歷史低點的1%開始提升至目前的5%。
綜觀兩國之間的經貿政策互動特性，在理性預期與雙方皆以未來報酬極大化作為政策導向時，本文建立了一個多階段的重複賽局模型，並藉由此模型與實證資料之蒐集，驗證理論與實證之異同，本文亦由此歸納出下列4點結論：（1）以中國的觀點來看，宏觀調控是中國的優勢競爭策略。（2）以美國的觀點來看，升息與緊縮性貨幣政策是美國的優勢競爭策略。（3）不論是否加入台灣作為影響賽局報酬之變數，此一賽局的均衡解有向左上角收斂的一致性。（4）此一賽局的均衡解將落入囚徒兩難的困境之中，雙方在長期且重複的模式下，仍因害怕遭受對方背叛而不願合作，提升雙方報酬。
In the international competitive environment, the economic and trade policies of various countries often have mutual influence. But international policies are also influenced by the factors, such as political culture, international relations, economic and trade background, etc... This research tries to analyse this decision-making process and result with the inter-dynamic of economic and trade policies of China and the United States. And, then we join Taiwan as a parameter of influence of policy remuneration of two countries, and analyse further whether the decision-making process still has the consistency, and the impact on China and the United States.
Thus far, the government of China''s Mainland has adopted the multiple measures of conducts, involving the steady monetary policies and the tightened financial policies, attempting to control the economic growth rate since the second half of 2003. It turns out overheated, and expected to be able to come to the long term target “soft-land”. In addition, the global boom intensifies gradually, and the inflation pressure is cumulative. The Federal Reserve Board has begun a series of actions of raising the discount rate gradually since June 30 of 2004, gone through 17 times and improved the federal fund interest rate from 1% of the historical low point to present 5.25%.
Take a broad view of the economic and trade inter-dynamic characteristic of policies between two countries, while both sides are all with the assumption of rational expectation and maximizing their payoffs in the future, this research develops a multi-stage game theoretical model to verify similarities and differences of the theory and real example. This research also sums up 4 the following conclusions: （1）According to view of China, macroeconomic adjustments and controls is the dominant strategy. （2）According to view of U.S.A., the tightening monetary policy is a dominant strategy. （3）No matter joining Taiwan as a parameter of influence of the game payoffs or not, the equilibrium of game is consistent in converging to the upper left corner. （4）The equilibrium of game falls into Prisoner ,s Dilemma. Both sides are under the long-term and repeated way, and still unwilling to cooperate because of fearing to be betrayed by the other side, raising the remuneration of both sides. |
