委託書徵求對股東財富之影響 : 臺灣地區上市公司之實證研究

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题名:	委託書徵求對股東財富之影響 : 臺灣地區上市公司之實證研究
其它题名:	The impact of proxy solicitation on shareholder's wealth : evidence from listed corporation in Taiwan 委託書徵求對股東財富之影響 : 台灣地區上市公司之實證研究
作者:	紀秀鳳;Chi, Hsiu-feng
贡献者:	淡江大學國際貿易學系國際企業學碩士在職專班潘玉葉;Pan, Yuh-yeh
关键词:	委託書徵求;事件研究法;股東財富;Proxy Solicitation;Event Study;Shareholder Wealth
日期:	2006
上传时间:	2010-01-11 01:20:20 (UTC+8)
摘要:	依公司法第一七四條規定：「股東會之決議，應有代表已發行股份總數過半數股東之出席，以出席股東表決權過半數之同意行之」，然國內上市公司董監事持股比率逐年下降，當上市公司欲召開股東會必須設法湊足半數以上之股權，如無法湊足者，只有從市場買進股票或進行委託書徵求兩種方式，而委託書徵求為台灣地區最常使用也是成本最低之一種方法，上市公司只為召開股東會，所需花費成本則較低；如遇上公司進行董監事改選，一旦公司內部不和，或非善意第三者欲介入公司經營權，此時委託書徵求成為取得經營權重要手段之一，本研究希望透過委託書徵求、經營權異動及持有現金比率多寡來探討其對於投資者之影響，希冀藉此研究提供投資人正確之觀念。經由實證分析，結論臚列如下：一、有、無董監改選兩組之累積異常報酬有顯著差異，且有董監改選之累積異常報酬大於無董監改選者，其結果與Dodd and Warner結果一致，顯示有董監改選之委託書徵求會使公司資源更具效率，這也表示市場已預知此一訊息，而將之反應在股價上。二、不管經營權是否產生異動，兩組樣本在事件日以前皆有顯著為正之累積異常報酬，主要原因可能為投資人對於市場派介入經營權之訊息有正面之態度，並且將其反應在股價上，其結果與Dodd and Warner(1983)及蘇文宏(2004)一致，認為反對派之參與會使得股東財富有正向影響。三、高現金持有比率公司相較於低現金持有比率公司有顯著為正之累積異常報酬，其結果與Faleye（2004）委託書徵求事件宣告的報酬與超額現金呈現正相關一致，證實委託書爭奪戰可消彌公司代理問題。四、每股盈餘對於委託書徵求公司股東財富具有顯著負向影響，公司每股盈餘愈低，所引發異常報酬率愈高，這也意味經營績效較差之公司委託書徵求愈加激烈。 According to Corporate Law No. 174, “decisions of stockholders’ meetings, should be attended by a quorum of over half the shareholders of all issued shares, and shall be agreed to by over half of those present.” Yet, domestic listed companies have a decreasing ratio of shares held by board members, so when the listed company wants to hold stockholders’ meetings, they must find ways to piece together over half of the share ownership. Those unable to do so only have two methods: buy stocks from the market or conduct proxy solicitation. Proxy solicitation is the most commonly used method in Taiwan and it is also one of the methods that incur the least expenses. If the listed company only seeks to hold stockholders’ meetings, then the costs are lower. If the company seeks to have elections of board members, and there are internal conflicts in the company or if a third party without goodwill seeks to intervene in the company management rights, proxy solicitation becomes an important means for the company to acquire company management rights. Thus, this study hopes to explore the influences of proxy solicitation and changes in management rights on investors, in hopes of providing investors with correct concepts. After empirical analysis, the conclusions are as follows: 1. Sample company with board seat elections had greater shareholder wealth increase than the sample company without board seat elections, and the difference between the two achieved statistical significance. 2. Two sample companies with change management rights and no change in management rights both had significant positive accumulated abnormal return. Also, the sample company with changes in management rights had a greater accumulated abnormal return than the sample company with no changes in management rights, but it was not statistically significant. 3. The sample companies with higher and lower cash ratio, both had significant positive accumulated abnormal return. Also, the sample company with higher cash ratio, in comparison to the sample company with lower cash ratio, had a greater effect on shareholder wealth, and the difference is statistically significant. 4.The study indicates that the EPS is significantly negative relative to the shareholders’ wealth of the proxy solicitation company in statistics. The lower the EPS is, the higher the unusual return would be. This also means that the company with poor performance would have a hard time in proxy soliciting.
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