一、有、無董監改選兩組之累積異常報酬有顯著差異，且有董監改 選之累積異常報酬大於無董監改選者，其結果與Dodd and Warner結果一致，顯示有董監改選之委託書徵求會使公司資源更具效率，這也表示市場已預知此一訊息，而將之反應在股價上。
二、不管經營權是否產生異動，兩組樣本在事件日以前皆有顯著為正之累積異常報酬，主要原因可能為投資人對於市場派介入經營權之訊息有正面之態度，並且將其反應在股價上，其結果與Dodd and Warner(1983)及蘇文宏(2004)一致，認為反對派之參與會使得股東財富有正向影響。
According to Corporate Law No. 174, “decisions of stockholders’ meetings, should be attended by a quorum of over half the shareholders of all issued shares, and shall be agreed to by over half of those present.” Yet, domestic listed companies have a decreasing ratio of shares held by board members, so when the listed company wants to hold stockholders’ meetings, they must find ways to piece together over half of the share ownership. Those unable to do so only have two methods: buy stocks from the market or conduct proxy solicitation. Proxy solicitation is the most commonly used method in Taiwan and it is also one of the methods that incur the least expenses. If the listed company only seeks to hold stockholders’ meetings, then the costs are lower. If the company seeks to have elections of board members, and there are internal conflicts in the company or if a third party without goodwill seeks to intervene in the company management rights, proxy solicitation becomes an important means for the company to acquire company management rights. Thus, this study hopes to explore the influences of proxy solicitation and changes in management rights on investors, in hopes of providing investors with correct concepts.
After empirical analysis, the conclusions are as follows:
1. Sample company with board seat elections had greater shareholder wealth increase than the sample company without board seat elections, and the difference between the two achieved statistical significance.
2. Two sample companies with change management rights and no change in management rights both had significant positive accumulated abnormal return. Also, the sample company with changes in management rights had a greater accumulated abnormal return than the sample company with no changes in management rights, but it was not statistically significant.
3. The sample companies with higher and lower cash ratio, both had significant positive accumulated abnormal return. Also, the sample company with higher cash ratio, in comparison to the sample company with lower cash ratio, had a greater effect on shareholder wealth, and the difference is statistically significant.
4.The study indicates that the EPS is significantly negative relative to the shareholders’ wealth of the proxy solicitation company in statistics. The lower the EPS is, the higher the unusual return would be. This also means that the company with poor performance would have a hard time in proxy soliciting.