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    題名: 成本差異下的垂直策略分析
    其他題名: The strategy of vertical competition under cost difference
    作者: 吳杭嶺;Wu, Hang-ling
    貢獻者: 淡江大學產業經濟學系碩士班
    陳宜亨;Chen, Yi-heng
    關鍵詞: 成本差異;垂直整合;寡占;封殺;Cost difference;Vertical integration;Oligopoly;Foreclosure
    日期: 2007
    上傳時間: 2010-01-11 01:19:55 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文建立一個具有成本差異的二家上游廠商,和N家相同下游廠商的連續市場,假設上游廠商可為庫諾及領導-跟隨競爭,而下游只能為庫諾競爭的情況下,探討上游廠商在垂直整合下游廠商後,採取部分封殺策略和完全封殺策略的不同影響。

    在沒有下游家數合併限制下,上游廠商會盡可能的多合併下游廠商,在可行的情況下,會直到合併全部下游廠商為止。當上游成本具優勢廠商整合且採行部分封殺策略,但不具成本優勢廠商不整合時,不論上游為庫諾競爭或領導-跟隨競爭,具成本優勢廠商在中間財貨市場皆會採行策略性販賣中間財。當上游不具成本優勢廠商整合且採行部分封殺策略,具成本優勢廠商不整合,則不論上游為庫諾競爭或領導-跟隨競爭,如果不具成本優勢廠商成本過高,則會在中間財市場採策略性購買中間財;反之,如果成本不太高,則會在中間財市場販賣中間財。

    中間財價格不會因為有廠商整合而上升,故中間財市場並不會出現市場封殺的狀況,且整合並不一定會使最終財價格上升而損害消費者權益,只有在整合家數過多的情況下才會對消費者不利。
    This paper establishes a model with two cost-differentiated upstream firms and N identical downstream firms in the market. Assume upstream firms can be either Cournot competition or Leader-Follower competition but downstream firms can only be Cournot competition. The equilibrium outcome under competition will be derived and then compared with the results under vertical integration as well as different foreclosure strategies. We would like to explore the effect of vertical integration with foreclosure strategy simultaneously on prices of intermediate goods and final goods.

    We found that if the number of target downstream is not limited, the merging upstream will try their best to merger as more downstream firms as possible until all the downstream firms are merged completely. If only the cost superior firm takes merger strategy and adopts partial foreclosure, it will buy intermediate goods to increase its profit no matter the upstream market is Cournot competition or Leader-Follower competition. However, if the cost inferior firm takes merger strategy and adopts partial foreclosure, it will buy intermediate goods when its cost is high above a certain level, but sell intermediate goods when its cost is below a certain level.

    The price of intermediate goods will not increase after the firms integrate. So the market foreclosure will not happen in the intermediate market. And the integration will not always make the final price increase to damage the consumer surplus. Only when there are too many firms integrate, then the consumer surplus will be decreased.
    顯示於類別:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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