生產因素市場訂價策略、R&D外溢效果與市場競爭模式之研究

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Title:	生產因素市場訂價策略、R&D外溢效果與市場競爭模式之研究
Other Titles:	The effect of input market price discrimination, R&D sillover and mode of market competition
Authors:	凌志文;Ling, Chih-wen
Contributors:	淡江大學產業經濟學系碩士班麥朝成;Mai, Chao-cheng
Keywords:	外溢效果;差別取價;Cournot數量競爭;Bertrand價格競爭;R&D;中間財;Spollover;Price-dicrimination;Cournot Competition;Bertrand competition;R&D;intermediate goods
Date:	2009
Issue Date:	2010-01-11 01:18:19 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本論文延伸DeGraba(1990)模型架構，在雙占最終財廠商生產同質產品時，考慮外溢效果，以及Cournot數量競爭和Bertrand價格競爭時，中間財廠商進行差別定價對社會福利的影響。我們發現在考慮外溢效果下，當中間財廠商採取單一定價時，廠商１的R&D數量會比較大。對廠商２而言，如果外溢效果為零，廠商２也會跟廠商１做一樣的決策，在單一定價下會有比較多的R&D。但有外溢效果產生時，廠商２在差別取價下會有比較多的R&D。另一方面也考慮下游廠商生產異質產品，但不考慮外溢效果的情況。我們去分析中間財的不同定價策略與下游不同的競爭模式，得到如下的結果：(1)考慮中間財的訂價策略情況，會發現當中間財廠商採用單一定價策略時，下游廠商不管採用何種競爭模式，消費者剩餘與社會福利都會比中間財廠商採用差別取價策略來的大。；(2)考慮下游廠商競爭模式時，會發現當中間財廠商不管採用哪種策略，下游廠商進行Bertrand價格競爭時，消費者剩餘與社會福利都會比進行Cournot數量競爭來的大。 This paper extends the DeGraba (1990) model, we examine the impacts of R&D spillover on firms’choices of strategic under the downstream firms produce a homogeneous output, and will discuss the impact of social welfare on monopoly supplier choices of strategic or the downstream firms use Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. We found that when considering the spillover effect, the firm 1 of R & D is relatively large, when the monopoly supplier use uniform pricing. If the spillover effect is zero, firm 2 will also do the same as the firm 1 decision. But if there has spillover effect, the firm 2 under the price-discrimination will have more R & D than uniform pricing. On the other hand, considering the downstream production of heterogeneous products, but do not consider the case of spillover effects. We analyze the different pricing strategies of monopoly supplier with a different mode of competition downstream, the results are as follows: (1) to consider the pricing strategy of monopoly supplier, we found out when the monopoly supplier use a uniform pricing strategy, consumer surplus and social welfare will be great than the monopoly supplier use price discrimination; (2) to consider the mode of downstream competition, we found that no matter what kind of strategy the monopoly supplier use on downstream firm Bertrand competition, the consumer surplus and social welfare are greater than the Cournot competition .
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics] Thesis

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