公司治理（Corporate Governance）為近年來管理學界中熱門的課題之一，而良好的公司治理機制將能保障企業的利害關係人，降低代理問題並且兼顧短期利潤與長期的永續經營目標。本研究欲探究高階經理人與董監事之持股比率對公司風險之關連性，以期做為企業長遠發展上的參考。 本研究以台灣之上市上櫃公司為研究對象，選取從1995年至2007年公司資料加以分析。實證結果顯示，高階經理人持股比率與企業風險較符合Jensen and Meckling（1976）所提出的「利益收斂假說」觀點，認為當管理者的持股比率愈高或股權愈集中時，愈有助於減少管理者與股東間的利益衝突，降低權益代理問題。 而董監事持股比率對於未來企業的成長風險為正相關，營運風險則呈現負相關，可能是因為董監事持股比率愈高，較重視當下的營運決策及獲利分配，而忽略了公司的整體成長性規劃，使公司的成長風險增加。 Corporate governance is one of the important subjects in the management science in recent years. Good corporate governance can protect the enterprise’s interests, reduce the agency problem and maintain both short-term profits and long-term steady operations. This study intends to investigate the relationship of the top management ownership, corporate ownership and firms’ default risks, and to provide useful references regarding enterprises’ long-term development. The sample of this study is a Taiwan stock-listed company, based on its record and history from 1995 to 2007. The result of this study reveals that, the relationship the relationship of the top manager ownership and the firms’ default risks is relatively consistent with the “Convergence-of-Interest Hypothesis” proposed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976. According to this hypothesis, the higher percentage the manager’s holding shares or the more centralized the stock ownerships, the less conflict occur between the top manager and the shareholder and the less agency problem happen. We also found that as the corporate ownership grows, the firms’ growth risks grow positively, but the firms’ operating risks reduce relatively. It could be assumed that the board members of a company tend to pay more attention to the present operational decisions and profit allocations, and tend to neglect the thoughtful planning on the company’s growth, causing the increase of the company’s growth risk.