珍珠港事件前美日對峙之決策過程

淡江大學機構典藏 > 國際事務學院 > 美國研究所 > 學位論文 > Item 987654321/31003

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题名:	珍珠港事件前美日對峙之決策過程
其它题名:	The decision making process of U.S.-Japan confrontation prior to the attack of Pearl harbor
作者:	曾建邦;Zeng, Jian-bang
贡献者:	淡江大學美國研究所碩士班陳一新;Chen, Edward I-hsin
关键词:	羅斯福;決策理論;珍珠港事件;Roosevelt Administration;Decision-Making Theory;Pearl Harbor
日期:	2009
上传时间:	2010-01-11 00:08:04 (UTC+8)
摘要:	珍珠港事件前，美國極力延緩美日雙方的持續衝突，以避免戰爭之爆發。但是，日本以南進政策為指導原則，逐漸與美國的政策及利益相悖，並影響到美國的遠東利益，美國迫不得已以經濟制裁之手段對付日本。儘管美國利用許多官方及非官方之管道，與日本相互溝通與協調，但最終仍不願意犧牲本身的利益與原則之下，導致珍珠港事件的爆發。因此，本文之研究目的在探討在珍珠港事件爆發前，羅斯福政府的決策過程。在理論架構上，本文以艾里遜提出的決策理論三種模式為研究架構，包括「理性模式」、「組織行為模式」、以及「政府政治模式」，將以此分析羅斯福政府的國際互動、美國的利益考量、組織部門的文化與能力、以及官僚的議價過程。在理性模式中，羅斯福政府受到國際利益、孤立主義與總統的個人因素影響下，強調歐戰為首要的利益考量，積極援助英國，並同時拖延日本發動戰爭，藉以維護遠東區的局勢。在組織模式中，由於組織的獨特的能力與組織文化，筆者將針對國務院與戰爭部分別提出驗證。雖然國務院擁有豐富的外交經驗，但是一如往常的標準作業程序，導致其應變能力有限，因而無法即時因應美日危機。至於戰爭部，由於軍方的組織系統雜亂不彰、行政效率混亂，以至於缺乏迅速應變的反應能力，而直接影響到後續的軍事計畫與行動進展。在政府政治模式中，決策參與者依據本身的立場與職位，透過議價優勢與行動管道，將使影響力大幅增加，進而掌握決策之主導權。雖然羅斯福總統仰賴各級官員提出意見，不過他仍然堅持必需拖延戰事的爆發。因此，本文之主旨為：儘管美國為了維護本身的利益與立場與日本進行協商，以儘量拖延戰爭的爆發，但最後仍因無法犧牲自身的遠東利益與基本原則，而被迫投入太平洋戰爭。 Prior to the attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States endeavored to smooth over problems between Japan and the U.S. Basically, Japan’s “southward policy” conflicted with America’s foreign policy. The Roosevelt Administration maintained what I call “postponement policy” and hoped to defer the hostilities. In the end, the U.S. still could not stop the hostilities at the expense of its own national interests. Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to explore the decision-making process of the Roosevelt Administration prior to the attack of Pearl Harbor. This thesis is under the framework of Graham Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and Governmental Politics Model (GPM), from the perspective of the Roosevelt Administration’s national interests, organizational culture and capability, and bureaucratic bargaining. To start with RAM, the Roosevelt Administration needed supporting Britain to resist Germany because the U.S. viewed the European War as its top priority. At the same time, the U.S. endeavored to defer Japan to go to war, and inclined to maintain the status quo in the Far East. As for OBM, Department of State (DOS) and Department of War (DOW) had different position and opinions due to the unique organizational culture and capabilities. DOS had rich foreign affairs experience and handled the problems with standard operation procedures. In this way, DOS insisted on its position and then could not achieve the breakthrough in the U.S.-Japan talks. Besides, DOW only offered limited military strength to the Fast East because of insufficient military force. Accordingly, DOW was unable to respond the crisis timely in the Pacific. With regard to GPM, President Roosevelt insisted a postponement policy must be maintained between the U.S. and Japan, having no desire to take military action against Japan. Hence, the U.S. only strived for time and hoped to prevent Japan from going to war. Consequently, the U.S. maintained a conversation with Japan, and deferred the bilateral hostilities to escalate as possible as it could, but eventually it could not but go to the Pacific War after the Pearl Harbor was attacked.
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