淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/31002
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    Title: 甘迺迪總統於豬灣行動決策過程中之角色分析
    Other Titles: Jfk's role in the decision-making process of bay of pigs invasion
    Authors: 李祥豪;Lee, Hsiang-hao
    Contributors: 淡江大學美國研究所碩士班
    陳一新;Chen, Edward I-hsin
    Keywords: 甘迺迪;豬灣行動;中情局;理性行為者模式;組織行為模式;政府政治模式;John F. Kennedy;Bay of Pigs Invasion;CIA;Rational Actor Model;Organizational Behavior Model;Governmental Politics Model
    Date: 2008
    Issue Date: 2010-01-11 00:08:02 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 在1961年「豬灣事件」慘敗後的一年裡,甘迺迪總統屢屢自問:「我怎會如此愚蠢,居然放任他們走到此步田地?」不僅當年的參加者納悶不已,同樣的問題也困惑著近五十年來研究本起案例的研究學者。儘管被視為美國史上最幹練的團隊之一,近乎全軍覆沒的外交慘敗,不僅令人大感詫異,更激起後人找尋失敗關鍵的興趣與必要。為此,本論文的目的即在探討美國於「豬灣事件」決策過程中的致命失誤,進而對此一經典案例中甘迺迪的角色定位與責任歸屬,做更深入的闡釋與分析。
    透過艾理遜教授所提出之決策理論三模式:「理性行為者模式」、「組織行為模式」、以及「政府政治模式」,本論文將試圖從國家利益、組織競爭、以及官員議價等角度,對本案例的最終決策做出聯結與剖析。
    後世的批評多將中情局的誤判視為誤導總統的關鍵所在。惟透過筆者的研究發現,位居權力頂端的甘迺迪總統,才是該為慘敗負起全責的核心角色。回顧事件始末,甘迺迪不僅隻手扭轉了組織專業評估後的既定政策選項,更在決策過程中憑己偏好促成了最終定案。如此一來,背離常軌的運作不僅即刻升高失敗風險,也需為最終全軍覆沒的下場,一肩扛起最大責任。
    “How could I have been so stupid as to let them proceed,” President John F. Kennedy repeatedly asked himself following the failure at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961. For more than forty-seven years, such question has not only been meditated by those former participants, but also been pondered by countless historians, policy analysts and researchers. It was surprised that how the Kennedy administration, which was generally acknowledged as one of the best ones in the American history, could allow such a disaster to take place. Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to figure out what went wrong with the United States in the Bay of Pigs invasion, thereby analyzing President Kennedy’s role in the decision-making process of this classic diplomatic fiasco.
    By applying Graham Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and Governmental Politics Model (GPM), this thesis would explore the case of Bay of Pigs fiasco from the perspectives of national interest, organizational struggle, and bureaucratic politics.
    The overwhelming majority of critics still believed CIA’s miscalculation was the crucial element to mislead president’s judgments. Nonetheless, taking the whole process and the eventual outcome of the Bay of Pigs case as evidence, JFK should actually take the major responsibility for this diplomatic disaster instead. It was thus discovered, when a president pays too much attention to the formation of his own foreign policy wishfully and act willfully without showing respect for the advice and suggestions of the professionals and related organizations, the risk of such a diplomatic defeat would immediately increase.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute of American Studies] Thesis

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