|摘要: ||在1961年「豬灣事件」慘敗後的一年裡，甘迺迪總統屢屢自問：「我怎會如此愚蠢，居然放任他們走到此步田地？」不僅當年的參加者納悶不已，同樣的問題也困惑著近五十年來研究本起案例的研究學者。儘管被視為美國史上最幹練的團隊之一，近乎全軍覆沒的外交慘敗，不僅令人大感詫異，更激起後人找尋失敗關鍵的興趣與必要。為此，本論文的目的即在探討美國於「豬灣事件」決策過程中的致命失誤，進而對此一經典案例中甘迺迪的角色定位與責任歸屬，做更深入的闡釋與分析。 |
“How could I have been so stupid as to let them proceed,” President John F. Kennedy repeatedly asked himself following the failure at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961. For more than forty-seven years, such question has not only been meditated by those former participants, but also been pondered by countless historians, policy analysts and researchers. It was surprised that how the Kennedy administration, which was generally acknowledged as one of the best ones in the American history, could allow such a disaster to take place. Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to figure out what went wrong with the United States in the Bay of Pigs invasion, thereby analyzing President Kennedy’s role in the decision-making process of this classic diplomatic fiasco.
By applying Graham Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and Governmental Politics Model (GPM), this thesis would explore the case of Bay of Pigs fiasco from the perspectives of national interest, organizational struggle, and bureaucratic politics.
The overwhelming majority of critics still believed CIA’s miscalculation was the crucial element to mislead president’s judgments. Nonetheless, taking the whole process and the eventual outcome of the Bay of Pigs case as evidence, JFK should actually take the major responsibility for this diplomatic disaster instead. It was thus discovered, when a president pays too much attention to the formation of his own foreign policy wishfully and act willfully without showing respect for the advice and suggestions of the professionals and related organizations, the risk of such a diplomatic defeat would immediately increase.