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    Title: 艾森豪政府在1954年日內瓦會議之政策
    Other Titles: The 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina : an analysis of the policy adopted by U.S. president Eisenhower's administration
    Authors: 陳威廷;Chen, Wei-ting
    Contributors: 淡江大學美國研究所碩士班
    戴萬欽;Tai, Wan-chin
    Keywords: 美國;艾森豪政府;日內瓦會議;中南半島;the Eisenhower Administration;Geneva Conference;united action;Decision making;domino theory;collective security
    Date: 2009
    Issue Date: 2010-01-11 00:07:45 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 法國與越盟之間位於中南半島的殖民戰爭自1946年開始,直到1954年日內瓦會議簽訂停戰協定後宣告結束,共歷時了9個年頭。其間,美國為了東南亞地區豐沛的天然資源所帶來的利益,以及該地區戰略地位的重要性,對法國政府提供了大量的物資援助。在艾森豪執政時期,由於「骨牌理論」的影響,其政府決策者相信一旦中南半島淪陷,整個東南亞地區將相繼遭到赤化,因此對法國政府的援助達到了一個高峰。然而,美國的援助無法使法國在戰場上得到勝利。相反的,法國政府因為在中南半島的戰事節節敗退,而有了退出了念頭。1954年的日內瓦會議就是在這樣的氣氛下舉辦。在冷戰的架構下,以和平談判解決中南半島的戰爭並不符合美國之利益。因此,艾森豪總統與國務卿杜勒斯試圖阻止日內瓦會議的舉行。在此企圖失敗後,美國的政策轉而尋求透過該會議,在東南亞地區建立起一個共同的防禦機制,藉此防止共產主義在此地區的擴散。
    據此,本論文運用決策模式中的理性行為者決策模式作為分析的架構,探討下列的假設:
    H:參加日內瓦會議雖不符合美國國會與民意的期望,但艾森豪政府將其視為防止共產主義在東南亞擴散的手段,故仍派遣代表參與會議的進行。
    在章節的分配上,第一章為緒論,闡述研究動機與目的、文獻回顧、研究理論,以及研究範圍。第二章探討理性行為者決策模式以及對本論文進行假設。第三章介紹日內瓦會議召開的背景,並探討艾森豪政府在會議召開之前所作出的評估。本章另對日內瓦協定的內容作摘要式的敘述,並探討其背後所代表的意義。第四章探討日內瓦會議舉辦期間,美國與其他與會國家之間的互動情形。本章的焦點放在美、中、英、法四個國家之上,並對於該四國外長杜勒斯、周恩來、艾登與畢多的交往情況做一詳實的敘述與分析。第五章分別以理性行為者決策模式對於總統艾森豪與國務卿杜勒斯的決策考量進行驗證,檢視其所採取的政策是否符合當時美國最大的國家利益。
    本論文的研究發現,論文中所提出的假設獲得驗證成立。艾森豪政府藉由參加日內瓦會議,欲在東南亞地區成立一個共同的防禦機制,並藉此防止共產主義在該地區的擴散。
    The colonial war between France and the Vietminh in Indochina started in 1946 and ended with the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954. The United States provided the French government considerable logistic assistance during this period of time because of both the strategic position and abundant resources of South East Asia. During the Eisenhower administration, decision makers were convinced of the validity of the domino theory (i.e., a belief that held once Indochina fell, the rest of South East Asia would also fall into the hand of communist powers), and therefore U.S. assistance to France reached its maximum at this time. However, U.S. assistance couldn’t guarantee victory for the French on the battlefield. Indeed, the French government actually sought to withdraw from Indochina because the conflict was worsening. It was under such circumstances that the Geneva Conference of 1954 was convened. Amidst the general atmosphere of the Cold War, ending the war in Indochina through peaceful compromise and negotiations did not correspond to U.S. interests. Therefore, Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John F. Dulles endeavored to block this Conference from being held. After their failed attempt, U.S. policy toward the Geneva Conference switched to one of building a collective defense organization in South East Asia, in order to contain the spread of communism.
    In this thesis, the author applies the rational model from decision-making theory as a framework for analysis. In particular, this thesis focuses on the exploration of the following hypothesis:
    H: Although the holding of the Geneva Conference didn’t correspond to U.S. expectations, President Eisenhower still sent a delegation because he thought that such an action could provide a means of stopping communism from spreading in South East Asia.
    In terms of structure, the first chapter provides the author’s motives, literature review, outlines of research theory, scope, rationale, and expected academic contributions. The second chapter discusses decision-making theory and the hypothesis stated above. The third chapter explores the background of the first Indochina war, the contents of the Geneva Accords, and U.S. preparation prior to the Geneva Conference. The fourth chapter focuses on the reactions between the participants at this Conference, especially on the U.S, Britain, France, and the People’s Republic of China. The fifth chapter uses a rational model to examine the decision-making process of the Eisenhower administration. The last chapter presents the conclusions of the thesis.
    The thesis concludes with two main findings: (1) the evidence fits with the author’s hypothesis that President Eisenhower considered the Geneva Conference a means of blocking communism from spreading in South East Asia, and (2) the Conference spelled deterioration in the relationship between the United States and the Britain. After World War I, the U.S and Britain remained allies and cooperated with each other in international affairs. However, during negotiations at the Geneva Conference, because of different concerns, the strategies of the two governments led to opposite and confrontational positions, eventually resulting in rising tensions between the two nations. This underscores the fact that in international relations, national interests reigns supreme above all other considerations.
    Appears in Collections:[美國研究所] 學位論文

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