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| Title: | 美國對臺袖手政策的提出與修正的決策過程 |
| Other Titles: | The decision making process of U.S. hands-off policy: from announcement to adjustment (January 5-June 27, 1950) |
| Authors: | 袁嘉鍠;Yuan, Chia-huang |
| Contributors: | 淡江大學美國研究所碩士班
陳一新;Chen, Edward I-hsin |
| Keywords: | 袖手政策;杜魯門;韓戰;決策過程;艾里遜;Hands-off policy;Truman;Graham Allison;Korean War |
| Date: | 2009 |
| Issue Date: | 2010-01-11 00:07:23 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 1950年6月25日「韓戰」的適時爆發，不僅徹底打亂美國亞洲全盤戰略部署，也從而改變蔣介石政府今後的命運。杜魯門在韓戰爆發後不久，隨即下令派遣第七艦隊進駐台海實行中立化政策，不啻是象徵美國政府放棄奉行對台袖手政策。因此，究竟韓戰的爆發是否是美國政府扭轉對台袖手政策的主因？乃是值得吾人深入探究的議題。本論文的研究目的即是在探討美國政府在「韓戰」爆發前後，對台政策從提出到修正的決策過程上，相關參與者與部會組織各自的考量為何，作深入的闡釋與分析。
透過運用艾里遜教授所提出之決策理論三模式：「理性行為模式」、「組織行為模式」與「政府政治模式」，本論文試圖個別從國家利益、組織競爭 (包括組織內部垂直競爭與組織間水平競爭) 以及官員間彼此議價、政治角力等視角，對本案例作相當程度的剖析與闡述。
經過理性模式之分析，本論文發現，美國政府是以「圍堵共產勢力擴張」作為思考與制定對台政策的前提。基於此因，美國政府之所以於韓戰爆發後即立即派遣第七艦隊進駐台海，完全是為了勿使共產勢力趁機坐大而損及美方國家利益所做的權宜之計。經過組織模式之分析，本論文發現，無論是在國務院內部的垂直競爭 (挺蔣與棄蔣的抗衡) 抑或是 國務院與軍方彼此組織間的水平競爭，最終皆是由主張棄蔣的一派得勝。即便最終軍方趁韓戰爆發之勢而成功獲取政府應允派遣艦隊護台，但肇因於政府未能同時應允擬定相關配套措施協助蔣介石政府，軍方也未能算是最終贏家。經過政府政治模式分析，本論文發現，在韓戰爆發後至6月27日杜魯門正式發表台海中立化政策為止，國務院艾奇遜憑藉其獨享與杜魯門良好的溝通管道，以及彼此忠貞的情誼，而能享有許多議價上的優勢。艾奇遜便倚靠這些議價上的優勢而能將自身觀點盡數向杜魯門告知，並間接左右杜魯門的對台政策思維，並在韓戰爆發後成功獲取杜魯門的支持與信任將對台政策制定大權全數交由其負責。
總結來說，本文主旨是美國政府對台政策，從韓戰爆發前採行所謂的袖手旁觀，到韓戰後的阻共防台，皆是著眼於外部國際環境變遷下的考量。蔣介石政府得以延續，完全是因杜魯門政府為了維護自身國家安全與利益所做的政治考量所作的權宜之計，而非是真心要助其重返大陸
With the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, it not only scuttled the grand strategy of the United States in Asia, but also changed the fate of the Chiang Kai-shek’s administration afterwards. As soon as the Korean War broke out, President Harry S. Truman ordered the 7th fleet to move to the Taiwan Strait so as to implement the policy of “Neutralization of the Straits of Formosa.” Such move was nothing but a change of hands-off policy toward Taiwan. Therefore the main purpose of this thesis is to explore what the decision maker, organizations and main participants had in mind in their policy toward Taiwan before and after the Korean War broke out.
By applying Graham Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and Government Politics Model (GPM), this thesis will focus on the U.S. policy toward Taiwan before and after the Korean War broke out from the perspective of the national interest, the competition between organizations, and bureaucratic politics.
Analyzing from the perspective of RAM, the thesis finds that U.S. Taiwan policy was made under the precondition of “containing the Communism to spread.” Therefore, it is the reason why the Truman administration ordered the 7th fleet to move to the Taiwan Strait immediately after the Korean War broke out. It is just some kind of expediency for the U.S. to protect its own national interest. From the perspective of OBM, the thesis find that no matter what kind of competition (intra- or inter- organization) between State Department and the military, the State Department was the only winner. Even the military successfully asked President Truman send 7th Fleet to move to protect Formosa, owing to lacking of some kind of economic-aid package to help Chiang’s administration, the military was nothing but the loser eventually. Analyzing from the perspective of GPM, the thesis finds that by depending on his good relationship with President Truman Secretary of State Dean Acheson could easily get the upper hand in U.S. Taiwan policy.
To sum, the main theme of this thesis is that U.S. Taiwan policy, from hands-off policy to the dispatch of the 7th fleet to protect Formosa, depended on the changes of outer international environment. The reason why Chiang Kai-shek’s administration could survive largely because the Truman administration wanted to protect U.S. national security and interest, not because he wanted to help Chiang Kai-shek to retake mainland China. |
| Appears in Collections: | [美國研究所] 學位論文
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