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|Other Titles: ||The decision making process of China white paper|
|Authors: ||賴亞欣;Lai, Ya-shin|
陳一新;Chen, Edward I-hsin
|Keywords: ||中國白皮書;決策理論;艾奇遜;中國幫;美中關係;杜魯門;China White Paper;Decision-Making Theory;Dean Acheson;China bloc;United States Relations with China;Harry Truman|
|Issue Date: ||2010-01-11 00:07:17 (UTC+8)|
United States government issued United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, commonly known as China White Paper, on August 5, 1949. The China White Paper placed the responsibility of loss of China on the corrupt and unpopular government of Chiang Kai-Shek, emphasizing that the Nationalists lost the mainland even though they received enormous American military and economic aid. On the press conference of August 4, President Truman indicated that the purpose in releasing the China White Paper is to insure that the policy toward China shall be based on informed and intelligent public opinion. President Truman pointed out that the role of American government in its relations with China had been subject to considerate misrepresentation, distortion, and misunderstanding. Those attitudes arouse because the government was reluctant to reveal certain facts relating to United States-China relations. Therefore, revealing those facts was the only way that the public and their representatives in Congress could have the understanding necessary to the sound evolution of the foreign policy in the Far East.
The author will apply three models of decision-making theory, namely the rational actor model, the organizational behavior model, and the governmental politics model, to analyze the decision-making process of China White Paper. Under the guidance of rational actor model, the thesis finds that United States government decided to release the China White Paper as soon as possible in order to convince the Congress and the public of the correctness of the policy to abandon the Nationalists, and simultaneously avoid the hostility between the administration and the Congress in China issue spreading to European Military Assistance Programs. Under the guidance of organizational behavior model, the thesis finds that the China White Paper could not reach the standard of fairness and objectivity because the writing team was under the influence of organizational culture and subculture, and the Letter of Transmittal was
adversely affected by the standard operating procedures. Under the guidance of governmental politics model, the thesis finds that Secretary of State Acheson enjoyed three bargaining advantages which were drawn from the decision-making style of President Truman, the access to meet the President alone, and the cozy relationship with Truman. These advantages enabled Acheson to obtain Truman’s support without making any concessions to other participants.
Applying the three decision-making models, the thesis can display the decision-making process of China White Paper more completely. The China White Paper “had to” be released because the government believed it was the only way to win over the Congress and the public. The China White Paper should release “as soon as possible” because the administration wanted to prevent the hostility in China issues from extending to the Military Assistance Programs. The China White Paper “did” release because Acheson wisely use his bargaining advantages to gain the support of President Truman. The China White Paper was released “on August 5” because Acheson had to give consideration to the opposition of his subordinates, awaiting the departure of Ambassador Stuart from China. The China White Paper “could not achieve its expected goal” because the organizational culture exercised influence on the writing team and the standard operating procedures affected the outcome of the Letter of Transmittal.
|Appears in Collections:||[美國研究所] 學位論文|
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