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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/30980

    Title: 美國政府因應中華民國「反攻大陸」政策之決策過程(1961-1968)
    Other Titles: The decision-making process of U.S. position toward Taiwan's "retaking the Chinese mainland" policy, 1961-1968
    Authors: 陳蒿堯;Chen, Hau-yau
    Contributors: 淡江大學美國研究所碩士班
    陳一新;Chen, Edward I-hsin
    Keywords: 中華民國「反攻大陸」政策;艾里遜決策理論;理性決策模式;組織決策模式;政府政治模式;美中台三邊關係;美國對華政策;蔣介石;甘迺迪政府;詹森政府;“Return to Mainland” Policy;Decision making;Rational Actor Model (RAM);Organizational Behavior Model (OBM);Governmental Politics Model (GPM);U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations;Chiang Kai-shek;John F. Kennedy;Lyndon B. Johnson
    Date: 2005
    Issue Date: 2010-01-11 00:06:58 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本論文以美國國務院出版的「美國外交關係」 (Foreign Relations of the United States, FRUS)、甘迺迪及詹森政府期間重要官員的回憶錄、甘迺迪總統和詹森總統圖書館網路上提供的口述回憶錄、中華民國外交部檔案為主要資料來源。運用比較方法(Comparative Method)探討美國因應中華民國政府「反攻大陸」政策之決策過程,分析(1)理性決策(2)政府組織文化與(3)官僚政治此三種模式,如何影響決策者在外交政策上的制訂與執行。論文的寫作時期雖跨兩任政府,但鋪陳方式以決策理論三個模式為主軸,全文文力求緊扣美國對「反攻大陸」的態度與因應立場。從本論文的研究中發現:不論甘迺迪或詹森政府,華府對台北「反攻大陸」政策的一貫因應立場都是支持並利用中華民國政府軍隊牽制中共,但絕不讓台灣突發的軍事行動將華府捲入兩岸戰爭以維護其國家利益。在冷戰兩極化的國際體系下,任何有關「反攻大陸」的軍事計劃令美國感到十分困擾。縱使美國無法完全掌控台北當局對「反攻大陸」的軍事準備,但甘迺迪政府時期對勸阻台北的行動卻達到一定的成效。就理性決策模式而言,美國因應中華民國「反攻大陸」的決策過程中,有五個重要的因素影響從甘迺迪到詹森政府因應的對策:(一)中蘇分裂擴大的可能性;(二)「兩個中國」政策的推動;(三)豬灣事件的衝擊;(四)中美共同防禦條約的制約;(五)中共核武能力的崛起與越戰的影響。甘迺迪上台初期,憚於國內政治輿論的紛擾、美國與中華民國情報合作系統失效,以及蔣介石可能無預期片面採取的非理性舉動,只好以拖延的方式減緩台北推動反攻的步調,同時以「七點保證」與中華民國進行有限的合作。詹森政府時期,因越戰因素及國內反戰聲浪高漲,對於中華民國政府所提之「反攻大西南計劃」直接予以拒絕。就組織決策模式而言,柯爾克接替莊萊德出任駐台大使,重回以國務院為主體的傳統外交管道,取代中情局所扮演的特別角色。中情局副局長克萊恩無法有效達成勸阻蔣介石的任務,柯爾克堅定且有效地「阻止」中華民國政府「反攻大陸」,為美國爭取到更多的反應時間,守住美國的國家利益。在扮演和中華民國政府溝通的角色上,國務院的任務執行力和達成效率都比中央情報局高,因而使國務院建議的拖延策略成為甘迺迪總統最終採納的行動方案。就政府政治決策模式而言,國務卿魯斯克不論是由國務院定調的對中華民國反攻大陸採取拖延政策,或是台海危機發生時,主張透過外交途徑向中共和蘇聯傳達美國不支持台北反攻的的立場,皆充分獲得甘迺迪政府的高度信任並取得政策主導權,反觀國防部長麥納瑪拉、中情局局長麥康、副局長克萊恩在因應台海危機政策形成的過程中,基於維持美國在亞太地區的戰略利益,主張以軍事行動保衛台灣,嚇阻中共進逼。兩種主張相較之下,美國的國家安全比美國在亞太地區的戰略利益更重要,因此,魯斯克提出的因應方案較能貼近甘迺迪的希望和符合美國實際的利益,因而能說服甘迺迪成為美國因應中華民國「反攻大陸」政策的最終決策。論文的主旨如下:美國在國際冷戰局勢的考量下,希望台灣能扮演一個美方的棋子,卻不願讓台北的「反攻大陸」政策將冷戰轉為熱戰。本論文探討的焦點,即針對甘迺迪和詹森對中華民國政府「反攻大陸」問題的因應與其決策過程。除了美國的國家利益考量外,亦將探討還有那些因素促使決策者決定勸阻中華民國政府「反攻大陸」的決定,而所謂的國家利益,又如何經由美國的決策者及其參與決策的重要官員與組織來界定。
    In early 1962, the Nationalists were tempted to try to exploit the serious economic difficulties in China to retake the Chinese mainland. In his New Year message, President Chiang Kai-shek asserted that the Government of Republic of China was preparing a major offensive and stood ready to assist mainland uprisings against the Communist. Although, his declaration implied that the United States could be expected to support such Nationalist military operations on the mainland. However, the implication in his New Year message was just his subjective wishful thinking. The main purpose of the thesis is to apply Graham Allison’s decision-making models, namely Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and Governmental Politics Model (GPM), to explore the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ position and policy toward Taipei’s policy of “Retaking the Chinese Mainland.” To begin with the RAM, both John F. Kennedy (JFK) and Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) did not want the Nationalist to return to the mainland. JFK finally decided to persuade Chiang to postpone his policy of “Return to Mainland,” whereas LBJ directly turned down Chiang’s request of American support for fear that U.S. would be dragged into war with Mainland China. JFK assigned the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, W. Averell Harriman, to show U.S. positions to GRC. First, the U.S. continued to assume that all discussions of “return to the mainland” were governed by the understanding in the exchange of notes between U.S. Secretary of States and Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs on December 10, 1954. Second, the U.S. believed that most careful studies were necessary of both intelligence and operational planning for proposed new venture. “You may draw, if you wish, on the Cuban Bay of Pigs misadventure as a proof of the dangers of bad intelligence, and a decision based more on hope than reality. You should emphasize our insistence on continued detailed intelligence and exchange of views,” Washington told Taipei. Finally, “Our earlier approval of 20-man drops was heavily connected with the fact we were no involved 200-man teams with U.S. air support are a wholly different matter, and while we too will await results of further study, you should indicate that support for such drops would be a major shift in policy for us and would have to be supported by compelling evidence,” the U.S. government added.As for the OBM, there are five fundamental gaps between what JFK actually approved and what he thought he was approving arose from at least three sources. First, they arose in part because the President just became the master of the White House. He did not fully know the strengths and weaknesses of his advisers respectively. He didn’t feel he could trust his own instincts against the judgments of experts. Second, these gaps arose in part because the pressures of time and secrecy permitted too little consideration of the plan and its merits by anyone other than its authors and advocates. Only the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had an opportunity to study and ponder the details of the plan. Finally, these gaps arose in part because the new administration had not yet fully organized itself for crisis planning, enabling the pre-committed authors and advocates of the project in the CIA and JCS to exercise a dominant influence.As for the GPM, if backing Chiang in his last dramatic gamble was against U.S. interests, Ambassador to the Republic of China Everett F. Drumright and Deputy Director of the CIA Ray S. Cline felt that the United States would shortly get a major approach from the GRC. Instead of waiting for it, there might be some advantages in jumping first by telling them how the U.S. government looked at the situation. Besides, American policy grew for the President’s belief that the People’s Republic of China was an expansionist and threatening power. The restraint demonstrated by the Chinese Communists in circumstances such as the Taiwan Straits did not alter Kennedy’s view that the United States confronted an aggressive Chinese expansionism. Kennedy’s fear of domestic political reprisals also worked to prevent him from introducing new elements into China policy. While the “Delay Policy” was the one that helped to contribute to the resolution of the 1962-1963 Taiwan Strait Crisis, President Kennedy decided to receive Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s suggestion and thought about the painful task of dissuading Chiang. Accordingly, although the U.S. supported the Nationalists to impede Communist China’s expansion, JFK accepted Dean Rusk and W. Averell Harriman’s suggestion, and LBJ decided to ignore Chiang’s ideas by lending no support to the “Retaking the Chinese Mainland” policy to protect the national interest of the United States.
    Appears in Collections:[美國研究所] 學位論文

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