本論文將就美國近三十年來最重大的聯邦選舉改革法案－麥肯與范戈法案（The McCain-Feingold Act）進行深入剖析。提案的參議員麥肯（John McCain）與范戈（Russ Feingold）矢志淨化聯邦選舉，矯正利益團體以政治獻金賄賂聯邦公職人員的不當行為。自一九九O年代開始，政黨擅長使用「黨務建設」的軟錢資助聯邦選舉，企業界和利益團體也樂於捐助鉅款，藉以和總統與國會議員拉近距離，以介入公共政策的制定。麥肯與范戈法案的立法過程備受責難，適逢美國政壇爆發多起政治獻金醜聞，龐大的輿論壓力衝擊白宮及國會，才使得反對立法的勢力瓦解。麥肯與范戈法案的首要改革對象為：「軟錢」（soft money）、「獨立支出」（independent expenditures）和「議題提倡」（issue advocacy）。二OO四年美國總統選舉為麥肯與范戈法案生效後的首次聯邦選舉，筆者藉此檢視法案的施行成果，並進行初步評估。 The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the McCain-Feingold Act, which has been the most significant campaign finance reform for the past thirty years. Since the 1990s, political parties have begun using the unregulated “soft money” donations to finance federal elections. Corporations and unions are willing to provide party officials with “soft money” to have access to the White House and the Congress. Senators John McCain and Russ Feingold proposed the bill in order to sever the link between large political contributors, federal elected officials and party leaders. The McCain-Feingold Act was designed to address three issues: the increased role of soft money in campaign financing, the proliferations of issue advocacy, and the misuse of independent expenditures. The McCain-Feingold Act was stalled in both Houses until the occurrence of the scandal. The bankruptcy of Enron refocused national attention on the power of money in politics and underscored the need for reform. The 2004 presidential election was the first campaign season operating under the new rule. This thesis evaluates the impacts of the McCain-Feingold Act.