本論文以美國國務院出版的美國外交關係及甘迺迪、詹森和尼克森時期之重要官員回憶錄及外交期刊為主要資料來源，運用個案研究法及比較研究法探討美國政府對聯合國中國代表權問題的決策過程，並且依據艾里遜的決策模式理論的理性模式、組織模式及官僚模式來分析美國政府對重要問題案的決策過程。 研究發現在重要問題案之理性決策模式中，決策者受到國內政治、國際戰略構想、個人的意識型態及對手國之國家本質影響甚深。甘迺迪在國會、利益團體、媒體及中共侵略本質不變的壓力下接受重要問題案；詹森則因為個人的反共意識及亞洲和平維護之構想影響下堅持沿用重要問題案為最終策略以圍堵中共；而尼克森則是為了實現聯中制蘇之戰略使用變化重要問題案，表面上演圍堵中共戲碼而實質上卻造成重要問題案失敗而台灣退出聯合國。在組織決策模式中，組織確實受組織文化之囿而影響所提供的政策選項，但最終這些政策選項仍有可能被採納成為政策。重要問題案雖有濃厚的圍堵色彩，主導中國政策的國務院遠東事務司卻能成功地讓甘迺迪與詹森採用此案作為美國的中國代表權策略。在官僚決策模式中，決策者們會因為各司其職而分別持有特定的立場，在此狀況下，各決策者的議價優勢則取決於他與上及之間的行動管道。國務卿魯斯克由於未取得甘迺迪信任而喪失其議價優勢；之後，在詹森時期他卻因為贏得詹森的青睞而掌握議價優勢；國家安全顧問季辛吉能取信於尼克森也是由於他比國務卿羅吉斯更能獲得總統的信任。 從筆者對三個模式的假設驗證中得到的結論是艾里遜的決策理論提供相當有用的架構，但適用程度仍視個別案例的不同情形而定。 This study is about the decision-making process of the US on the Important Question Resolution from 1961 to 1971 which based on three decision-making paradigms— Rational Actor Model(RAM), Organizational Behavior Model(OBM) and Governmental Politics Model(GPM) — formalized by Allison in the case study of Cuban missile crisis. A systematic empirical evaluation is undertaken to determine the applicability of the models. By applying RAM in the case, it shows that a rational actor is not always rational. Decision makers'' ideology, strategy planning and the other domestic factors such as the press from the interests groups, media and the Congress will influence the decision maker. By applying of OBM in the case, it shows that organizational behavior is often dominated by the organizational culture however the culture doesn''t necessarily lower the possibility of the policy option to be adopted as a policy. By applying GPM in the case, it reveals that policy makers have to control the action channel to take the bargaining advantages and to persuade the final decision maker successfully. The results of the study indicate that Allison''s three decision making paradigms are not applicable for all cases but they do offer a good framework for analyzing foreign policy.
