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    題名: 甘迺迪政府要求兩岸降溫自制之決策過程(1962,1~6)
    其他題名: The decision process of the Kennedy administration urge Self-restraint on both sides of the Taiwan strait in 1962
    作者: 羅文豪;Lo, Wen-hao
    貢獻者: 淡江大學美國研究所碩士班
    陳一新;Chen, Edward I-hsin
    關鍵詞: 理性決策者模式;組織行為模式;政府政治模式;甘迺迪;蔣介石;反攻大陸;Rational Actor Model;Organizational Behavior Model;Governmental Politics Model;John F. Kennedy;Chiang Kai-shek;Return to Mainland
    日期: 2006
    上傳時間: 2010-01-11 00:05:28 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本論文以國務院解密的「美國外交關係」(Foreign Relations of the United States, FRUS)為主,其內容主要是從美國國家檔案館所收藏國務院本身的檔案,以及美國駐外使領館檔案這兩部分編纂而成。包括了國務院的文件記錄,亦有白宮文件和其它相關機構的檔案。藉由當時官方往來的電訊紀錄、公文與備忘錄,瞭解當時美國參與決策者的立場與考量,以及當時的與會情形。中共當時因實行三面紅旗等政策失當,加上天災人禍,導致大陸產生難民潮,並於一九六二年達到最高峰。蔣介石因而認定為反攻大陸的最佳時機,並積極準備一切反攻事宜。而美國在反攻計畫中扮演著決定性的角色,因此蔣介石不斷尋求軍事援助,試圖獲得美國的同意。
    本文以哈佛大學教授艾里遜(Graham T. Allison)所提出的決策理論作為研究架構,以「理性決策者模式」(Rational Actor Model)、「組織行為模式」(Organizational Behavior Model)、以及「政府政治模式」(Governmental Politics Model)等三個面向,探討甘迺迪政府如何因應蔣介石反攻大陸,並在一九六二年海峽兩岸大戰可能一觸即發時,成功地化解危機。研究方法採用個案研究法,剖析美國外交政策制定過程,探討甘迺迪政府如何因應兩岸局勢演變,藉由美國對兩岸政策的演變脈絡來瞭解決策的本質。
    理性決策者模式聚焦於決策者重大考量的議題上,判斷對手國的舉動,並從幕僚所提供的選項中,選擇最佳的解決方案。甘迺迪上任後,雖有意改變兩岸政策,採取兩個中國政策,但在國內政治的考量下,決定延至第二任期實施。同時美國觀察中蘇共之間的分裂,不願讓雙方藉兩岸問題來修補破裂的關係,因此甘迺迪不願有所變動。而豬玀灣事件失敗,更是影響甘迺迪對秘密任務的信心。
    組織行為模式討論組織之間的競爭,彼此角力追求組織利益;以及內部文化、標準作業程序對政策的產出。組織特性與形成背景不同,切入角度不同,因此在外交政策抱持不同立場。中情局鑑於情報收集的目的以及與台灣高層互動良好,於是對反攻抱持同情支持的立場,甚至多次替蔣介石向華府宣傳。國務院依循兩岸事務的經驗,並不看好反攻計畫,但是斷然拒絕可能引起台北的反彈,因此採行知情不作為的方式,設法拖延台北的行動。
    政府政治模式為眾多決策參與者之間相互政治拔河,並且設法取得行動管道,進而獲得政策主導權。莊萊德與克萊恩長期與中華民國合作,並且與其高層決策人士互動關係良好,蔣介石因此透過他們向華府傳達反攻的決心。最後在軍事氛圍升高的情況下,美國透國華沙會談管道向中共溝通,表示不會協助蔣介石的反攻行動,並堅持共同防禦條約的防禦性,因此華府與北京在此一議題上取得共識。
    美國在考量全球冷戰對峙、美中長期情報合作、以及台灣在「太平洋島嶼防禦鏈」中的戰略位置,不得不有限度的介入,避免蔣介石片面採取軍事行動。隨著中共東南亞沿海大規模軍事集結,兩岸情勢頓時陷入極度緊張,美國採取雙重嚇阻策略,召開記者會向國際間清楚表達美國不支持蔣介石反攻的立場,同時派遣第七艦隊在台灣海峽巡邏,展現不放棄台灣的決心,一觸即發的台海危機因此而平緩下來。
    In the first half of 1962, a crisis situation arose, this time created by Republic of China President Chiang Kai-shek. The Mainland China was suffering from a serious famine as a result of the excesses of the Great Leap. This caused a period of major discontent on the mainland. In addition, the Communist China and the Soviet Union were engaged in a bitter ideological struggle. Chiang wanted to take advantage of this situation. In response, the Communist government began to concentrate ground troops and air force in Fujian Province. In order to ease the crisis, the United States urged both sides self-restraint to keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait.
    The main purpose of the thesis is to analyze the decision-making process of the Kennedy administration in the cross-strait crisis. As to the methodology, this thesis follows the “Case Studies Research Method.” It has been divided into three parts to analyze how the different policymakers make the final choice under the framework of Allison’s decision-making models: Rational Actor Model(RAM), Organizational Behavior Model(OBM), and Governmental Politics Model(GPM). Meanwhile, the writer has extracted three hypotheses from the models to test them in the related case studies.
    To begin with the RAM, U.S. President John F. Kennedy sought to defend the US national interest first. If the US assisted Chiang to retake the Mainland, it might be dragged into war. Also, the US government was extremely sensitive to the fragile relationship between the Communist China and the Soviet Union. Since Kennedy did not win a large majority in the presidential election, he preferred not to make any aggressive moves in foreign policy. Therefore, Kennedy made it clear that the mutual defense commitment was defensive in nature.
    As for the OBM, the Central Intelligent Agency(CIA) and Department of States(DOS) had differing opinions. The CIA suggested assisting the Nationalists with limited armed intervention, but the DOS turned down the plan. Because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy rejected Chiang’s plan to recover the Mainland China. This brought an end to the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1962.
    From the perspectives of GPM, the Kennedy administration used the action-channels to communicate with both sides. The US government cooled down the military concentration in Fujian Province and secretly assured the Chinese via diplomatic channels that the US would not support "any Nationalist attempts to invade the mainland." After that, President Kennedy rejected Chiang’s plan and stated the US position clearly to journalists. Chiang’s dream of recovering mainland would not come true.
    顯示於類別:[美國研究所] 學位論文

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