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    Title: 西班牙社會主義勞工黨執政時期薪資協議之研究(1982-1996)
    Other Titles: Wage bargaining under Spanish socialist government (1982-1996)
    Authors: 丁秋仁;Ding, Chiou-ren
    Contributors: 淡江大學歐洲研究所碩士班
    蔡政文;Tsai, Cheng-wen
    Keywords: 西班牙;組合主義;薪資協議;社工黨;全國總工會;Spain;Corporatism;Wage Bargaining;PSOE;UGT
    Date: 2007
    Issue Date: 2010-01-11 00:01:51 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 社會協定與協約已構成西班牙後佛朗哥時期民主決策過程中的一部分。其中工會依據所得政策節制勞工的薪資要求,有效控制通貨膨脹、提高公司獲利,並且成功創造就業機會。因此,社會協約向來受到社會民主黨政府的愛戴,以及工會及雇主的支持。不過西班牙的協約進程卻在「西班牙社會主義勞工黨」(Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE)執政期間終止,政府甚至決定以緊縮經濟政策取代所得政策來節制勞工薪資。1988年12月,西班牙國內兩大工會聯合號召第二共和(1931-1936)以來規模最大的全國總罷工,此次罷工不但象徵著社會主義工會與政黨的關係決裂,亦代表往後的協約進程將更加艱難。
    本文將研究重點放在工會、雇主與政府三方之間的策略互動關係對協約進程的影響,特別是工會與政府之間的關係。儘管全球化與新生產系統會威脅到社會協約的基礎,不過國內社會行為者之間的協約意願才是真正決定是否繼續集體協議的重要因素。
    本文發現,西班牙協約的終止除了本身制度不夠完整外,與社工黨政府的集權程度也有重大的關聯。即使社會行為者已協議出一個確切的協定,卻欠缺立法制度的基礎,因此延襲自舊時的協約機制發揮的再完美,都無法算是能長期作為決策的工具,充其量不過仍是個暫時調解意見的途徑。雖然社工黨執政時期的社會協議仍保有國家組合主義的遺影,但是社會行為者的政治學習過程將讓西班牙協約進程不止於此。西班牙在1999年正式加入歐洲貨幣聯盟後,政府更是需要透過協約來節制勞工薪資,而工會與雇主團體亦需要藉此發展集體財,以提升國內公司的競爭力,同時保護勞工在勞動市場上的權益。由此可見,社會協約在西班牙面臨經濟挑戰時,意含著不可或缺的重要性。
    Social pacts and concertation have become established as part and parcel of the post-Franco policy process in Spain. While unions cooperate to moderate wage demands in accord with income policy, based on the agreements among unions, employers and at times the government, it would contribute to keep inflation low, increase profitability and thus create jobs. In this regard, social democratic governments have traditionally been more open to the participation of unions and employers in collective bargaining and macroeconomic policy making.
    The concertation, however, collapsed during the government of Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). By December 1988, the two major unions in Spain called an ever most unprecedented general strike since the Second Republic to oppose some of government’s unilateral programmes. The significance of this strike meant not only the break-up of the socialist party-union relations in Spain, but also the difficulties to be emerged from the path to a successful concertation.
    This study focus on the impacts of the strategic interaction among tripartite, particularly the subsidiary role played by socialist union to government, on the concertation process. Given the institutional immaturity of Spanish concertation itself, the unchallengeable and decisive power on PSOE government’s hands is another major cause to the collapse of policy process. Even where pacts had been concluded, these were not on the basis of institutional and legislative arrangements. Although the social bargaining during the government of PSOE had something to do with the legacy of the statist corporatism, the efforts of political learning of social actors tend not end concertation process at which it has been. As a formal member in European Monetary Union (EMU), there is an exact need for Spanish government to moderate wage demand through social concertation; meanwhile, it is also necessary for unions and employer associations to develop collective goods in the same way, so as to enhance competitiveness of domestic firms, and to defend labours’ rights and interests on the labour market.
    Appears in Collections:[歐洲研究所] 學位論文

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