共軍聯合登陸作戰能力虛實研究

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Title:	共軍聯合登陸作戰能力虛實研究
Other Titles:	A research of China's military's combined amphibious-landing operation capability
Authors:	劉慎謨;Liu, Sheen-mo
Contributors:	淡江大學國際事務與戰略研究所碩士班曾復生
Keywords:	登陸作戰能力;Landing Operation Capability
Date:	2008
Issue Date:	2010-01-10 23:41:15 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	隨著第一、二次波斯灣及科索沃戰爭的爆發，美國以迅雷不及掩耳的速度結束戰爭，帶動了一連串的世界戰略轉變，對中共國防軍事上有著嚴重的衝擊，顛覆了傳統的軍事思想與戰略戰法，為因應未來戰爭型態，在軍事上投入大量發展計畫，並在軍事思想的轉變、戰術戰法的創新、武器裝備的研發、科技航天的發展均有成效，共軍的軍事思想在此種條件下逐漸形成。而共軍的部隊訓練向來係依據不同時代之環境背景來決定訓練方針，如1993年－打贏高技術條件下的局部戰爭；1995年－兩個轉變；1997年－科技大練兵等；1999及2003年則是汲取「科索沃戰爭」與「第二次波斯灣戰爭」之經驗，廣泛運用於年度各軍、兵種之年終訓練考核，再逐步推廣至各部隊進行演練，檢驗訓練成效，並置重點於強化「新三打三防」演練。另共軍為抗擊未來解決台灣問題可能干預之美軍，進一步研擬「先打無人飛機、再擊有人飛機」、「先防精確制導武器、再抗巡弋導彈」、「先打預警飛機、再抗航母編隊」、「先打隱形飛機、再抗擊轟炸機」四項新戰法，為未來「抗美奪台」作準備。本論文主要在探討共軍對台軍事演習作戰能力及預測共軍未來以軍事行動處理台灣問題可能方式，並就相關議題提出建議，本文共分六章：第一章緒論首先針對研究動機與目的、範圍與限制、方法與架構等提出說明，並對有關軍事戰略相關名詞作一界定，再對台軍事演習作戰的文獻作整理及評析。第二章闡述共軍軍事戰略思維形成與聯合登陸作戰的基礎與戰法。第三章分析共軍聯合登陸作戰的執行步驟，瞭解其先期、登陸及島上作戰之能力。第四章根據共軍1995-2004年東山島聯合軍事演習，比較其戰術戰法轉變之處、抗美奪台能力及戰略意涵。第五章探討共軍先期作戰、海上突擊登陸、空中突擊著陸、島上作戰各階段之特、弱點及虛實評估。第六章結論。綜合而言，中共對台軍事策略，概分為三個面向：一是2007年之前將完成對台所謂全面形成應急作戰能力；二是2010年之前具備大規模作戰能力；三是2015年之前具備決戰決勝能力，以此反思，並檢驗共軍對台歷次演習模式，顯然在此策略之下，正逐步落實當中。古有明訓：前事不忘，後事之師。在兩岸關係混沌不明，以及美國、日本關切台海，並未做出任何軍事承諾之際，呼籲國人本乎「無恃敵之不來，恃吾有以待之………」。 After the U.S. ended the first and the second Persian Gulf Wars and the Kosovo War in a very short time, China changed its traditional military thinking and strategy, which brought a transition in military strategy. For accommodating the war mode in the future, China has developed mass military plans. Not only the change and innovation were made about the military thought and tactics, but also the army and technology were effectively researched and developed. China’s military thinking has been formed gradually under such circumstances. China’s military decides its training principles according to the environmental background in different times such as the training focused on how to win a regional war under the condition of high technology in 1993; on “Two Changes” in 1995; on “Technological Exercise” in 1997. In 1999 and 2003, China gained experiences from Kosovo War and the second Persian Gulf War and applied them to the annual training assessments in every military branch, then extended to each unit for exercise, examined the results and put emphasis on the exercise of “New Three Attacks and Three Defenses”. Furthermore, to deal with the U.S. forces, which may intervene in Taiwan issue, China’s military established four new tactics for the preparation of the future war against the U.S.: “Strike the unmanned airplane first and then the manned airplane”; “Guard against precision guidance weapons and then cruise missiles”; “Strike the early warning aircraft first and then carrier battle group”; “Strike the invisible aircraft first and then the bomber aircraft”. This research mainly probes into China’s ability of military exercise towards Taiwan and to predict how China’s military will handle Taiwan issue with its military forces. Chapter One discusses motivation and purpose, scope and limitations, and method and structure. The relative nouns of military strategy are defined, and the references on military exercise towards Taiwan are reviewed. Chapter Two elaborates the formation of China’s military strategic thinking and the basic tactic of Amphibious-Landing Operation. Chapter Three analyzes the steps of Combined Amphibious-Landing Operation of exercised by China’s military and to find out its ability of preliminary, landing and land operations. Chapter Four compares the transmission of the tactics, the ability of resistance against U.S. and the meaning of strategy with the exercises near Dongshan Island during 1995 and 2004. Chapter Five probes into the features and evaluation of each operation stages of China’s military, which includes the preliminary operations, ocean assault landing, air assault landing and land operation. Chapter Six comes to the conclusion. In conclusion, China''s military strategy against Taiwan can be divided into three dimensions: First, the completion of its military forces against Taiwan in all areas before 2007. Second, the possession of the fighting ability of large-scale before 2010. Third, the capability to win any type of war in a short time before 2010. Based on these dimensions, we can find that China is approaching its goals over the years after examining the China’s military exercise towards Taiwan. While the relation between China and Taiwan is not clear, and the U.S. and Japan have not made any promise on military issues, it is recommended that our nation to be prepared for the future war and get ready to engage at any time.
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