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|Other Titles: ||A research of China's military's combined amphibious-landing operation capability|
|Authors: ||劉慎謨;Liu, Sheen-mo|
|Keywords: ||登陸作戰能力;Landing Operation Capability|
|Issue Date: ||2010-01-10 23:41:15 (UTC+8)|
After the U.S. ended the first and the second Persian Gulf Wars and the Kosovo War in a very short time, China changed its traditional military thinking and strategy, which brought a transition in military strategy. For accommodating the war mode in the future, China has developed mass military plans. Not only the change and innovation were made about the military thought and tactics, but also the army and technology were effectively researched and developed. China’s military thinking has been formed gradually under such circumstances.
China’s military decides its training principles according to the environmental background in different times such as the training focused on how to win a regional war under the condition of high technology in 1993; on “Two Changes” in 1995; on “Technological Exercise” in 1997. In 1999 and 2003, China gained experiences from Kosovo War and the second Persian Gulf War and applied them to the annual training assessments in every military branch, then extended to each unit for exercise, examined the results and put emphasis on the exercise of “New Three Attacks and Three Defenses”. Furthermore, to deal with the U.S. forces, which may intervene in Taiwan issue, China’s military established four new tactics for the preparation of the future war against the U.S.: “Strike the unmanned airplane first and then the manned airplane”; “Guard against precision guidance weapons and then cruise missiles”; “Strike the early warning aircraft first and then carrier battle group”; “Strike the invisible aircraft first and then the bomber aircraft”.
This research mainly probes into China’s ability of military exercise towards Taiwan and to predict how China’s military will handle Taiwan issue with its military forces. Chapter One discusses motivation and purpose, scope and limitations, and method and structure. The relative nouns of military strategy are defined, and the references on military exercise towards Taiwan are reviewed. Chapter Two elaborates the formation of China’s military strategic thinking and the basic tactic of Amphibious-Landing Operation. Chapter Three analyzes the steps of Combined Amphibious-Landing Operation of exercised by China’s military and to find out its ability of preliminary, landing and land operations. Chapter Four compares the transmission of the tactics, the ability of resistance against U.S. and the meaning of strategy with the exercises near Dongshan Island during 1995 and 2004. Chapter Five probes into the features and evaluation of each operation stages of China’s military, which includes the preliminary operations, ocean assault landing, air assault landing and land operation. Chapter Six comes to the conclusion.
In conclusion, China''s military strategy against Taiwan can be divided into three dimensions: First, the completion of its military forces against Taiwan in all areas before 2007. Second, the possession of the fighting ability of large-scale before 2010. Third, the capability to win any type of war in a short time before 2010. Based on these dimensions, we can find that China is approaching its goals over the years after examining the China’s military exercise towards Taiwan. While the relation between China and Taiwan is not clear, and the U.S. and Japan have not made any promise on military issues, it is recommended that our nation to be prepared for the future war and get ready to engage at any time.
|Appears in Collections:||[國際事務與戰略研究所] 學位論文|
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