蘇聯對國民政府的軍援政策(1937-1941)

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Title:	蘇聯對國民政府的軍援政策(1937-1941)
Other Titles:	Soviet policy of military assistance to the nationalist China during the period of : 1937-1941
Authors:	蔡文欽;Tsai, Wen-chin
Contributors:	淡江大學俄羅斯研究所碩士班戴萬欽;Tai, Wan-chin
Keywords:	蘇聯戰略;軍事援助;軍事顧問;外援;抗戰;中蘇關係;Soviet Strategy;Military Assistance;Military Adviser;Foreign Aid;Sino-Japanese War;Sino-Soviet Relations
Date:	2006
Issue Date:	2010-01-10 23:37:07 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	在1930年代的遠東地區，日本展露崛起後的擴張意圖，中蘇兩國雖有共同利益，但起初雙方並未確定彼此關係，直至互不侵犯條約簽訂後，雙方才展開跨外交、軍事、經濟等領域的合作。本篇論文闡述蘇聯對國民政府輸出軍援政策的緣由、執行及影響。研究焦點著重於蘇聯各範疇的具體軍援措施，以探討蘇聯遠東戰略計劃及其戰略構想，且針對蘇聯侵犯中國主權的行動予以客觀評價。本篇論文所討論之議題如下：一、蘇聯與國民政府的共同目標及蘇聯輸出軍援政策的緣由。二、蘇聯對國民政府提供直接與間接援助行動的目的。三、蘇聯軍援行動所獲致的成效及影響。四、蘇聯對遠東地區各關係國的戰略構想。五、蘇聯輸出軍援政策的總體成效及各種侵犯中國主權的行動措施。透過評析以及徵引藏於俄國、台灣各檔案館有關蘇聯軍援國民政府的史料及文獻，本篇論文的主要結論如下所述： (一) 中蘇雙方的共同目標在於外交上推動區域安全組織；軍事上建立軍援授受關係；經濟上互通有無。在國際綏靖氛圍濃厚而無法召集區域安全組織的情形下，蘇聯採取支撐國民政府對日作戰以拖延日軍軍力向北推進，並以軍援政策為其援助國民政府的手段。 (二) 蘇聯直接軍援行動目的為避免戰爭蔓延至蘇聯本土；間接軍援行動目的為消除歐亞兩面作戰威脅。 (三) 蘇聯達成了拖延日軍北進的遠東短程戰略計劃，以及誘迫日軍南進的長程戰略計劃。 (四) 在蘇聯剛柔並濟的戰略思想下，對日本、中國及歐美之遠東戰略構想分別為：一、「誘」「迫」日本媾和謀利；二、「派」「駐」中國困滯日本；三、「合」「縱」歐美涉入遠東。 (五) 蘇聯軍援政策達到「不戰而屈人之兵」的目的。首先延續國民政府對日本的作戰能力，完成蘇聯短程戰略目標；再者加速歐美涉入遠東，增加國民政府作戰夥伴於無形中，促成蘇聯長程戰略目標。 As the Sino-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty had been set up, the Nationalist China and the USSR got into cooperation among diplomatics, military, economics affairs. This thesis describes the reasons, operations, and effects of Soviet policy of military assistance to the Nationalist China. The main point of this thesis focuses on analysis of each category of Soviet objectives, and focuses on evaluating the cohesion of Soviet policies and strategies. In addition, it also gives an objective evaluation of those acts with continuing influences, which called the infringement of the national interests of China. This thesis discusses on the following arguments: 1. Convergence of national aims and interests between the Nationalist China and the USSR. 2. The reason why the Soviet policy of military assisted the Nationalist China was formulated. 3. The purpose of Soviet direct and consequential assistance to the Nationalist China. 4. The concept of Soviet strategy in the Far East. 5. The effort of Soviet military assistance. Combining the conventional analysis and citing Sino and Soviet former files on Soviet military assistance archive in Taiwan and Russia, the mean conclusions of this study are as bellow: (1) The peace of the Far East was the same purpose of the Nationalist China and the USSR. 1) The same purpose of diplomacy was building up regional security organization. 2) The same military objective was building up donor-recipient relationship. 3) The same interests of economic was to meet each other''s needs. (2) The USSR integrated acts of strategy into a single cohesive, global approach to achieving Soviet strategy goals though, with, and in China and the Far East for its security interests. (3) The USSR assisted the Nationalist China directly in order to against the war extended to the territory of Russia; the USSR assisted the Nationalist China consequentially because of threats from both the East and the West. (4) 1) The USSR baited and oppressed Japan to strike a compromise for Soviet national interests. 2) The USSR allocated military resource to the Nationalist China and encamped on China battlefield to hold up Japanese troop. 3) The USSR wanted to impel the power of Westerners into the Far East by the approach of cooperation and nonintervention. (5) The USSR achieved the top level for a fighter as the saying of Sun Zi - To defeat an adversary without fight.
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