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| Title: | 中共對台政策之研究(1989~2005) |
| Other Titles: | Strategies on Taiwan issue, carrot-and-stick dual strategies, one country, two systems, anti-secession law
中共對臺政策之研究(1989~2005) |
| Authors: | 吳兆漢;Wu, Chao-han |
| Contributors: | 淡江大學中國大陸研究所碩士在職專班
王西田;張五岳;Chang, Wu-yeh |
| Keywords: | 對台政策;和戰策略;一國兩制;反分裂國家法;Strategies on Taiwan Issue;Carrot-and-stick Dual Strategies;One Country;Two Systems;anti-secession law |
| Date: | 2007 |
| Issue Date: | 2010-01-10 23:34:58 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究係由「和」與「戰」的雙重策略為角度，分析探討由1989年至2004年間中國對台策略。
首先毛澤東時期中共由1949年建政至1978年鄧小平復出，該階段中共對台政策主要為「武力解決」，處心積慮企圖使用軍事手段「解放台灣」，但並不排除以「和平爭取」的方式，後者在此時期較不明顯。
而後鄧小平時期始自1978年底中共十一屆三中全會，鄧小平正式掌權至1989年六四天安門事件後，鄧小平辭去軍委主席隱身幕後及至江澤民執政初期。此一階段的中共對台政策主軸為「和平統一，一國兩制」，又稱「和平統一時期」，但不排除以「武力解決」台灣問題。
江澤民執政時期對台政策主軸為加強「和平統一、一國兩制」策略，主要內容包括絕不承認台灣為與中共對等的政治實體，台灣所採取任何自保行為，倘有礙中共意念及利益，中共將難以容忍。北京當局表面上尊重台灣人民權益，宣稱願意促成和平統一，實則恃強凌弱，要求台灣自動歸降。
面對台灣2000年首次政黨輪替，中國第四代領導人胡錦濤於2002年起陸續接任中共中央總書記與中央軍委主席後，發表對台工作的四點「絕不」，包括了堅持一個中國原則絕不動搖、爭取和平統一的努力絕不放棄、貫徹寄希望於臺灣人民的方針絕不改變，以及反對台獨活動絕不妥協。中國更透過「反分裂國家法」，首次明確提出了於三種情況下可用「非和平手段」處理臺灣問題的底線，顯示中國對日漸強化的台灣民主運動感到極大的不安。
為緩和台灣內部的反彈，及國際社會對「反分裂國家法」的嚴重關切，胡錦濤邀請台灣在野的國民黨與親民黨、新黨人士訪中，企圖營造雙邊民間交往和緩與政治和解的氣氛，值此同時北京方面亦片面宣布對台灣水果實施進口免關稅等措施以達其政策說法的一致性，惟兩岸官方正式往來因政治的理念相距甚遠故此時仍陷於停頓中。
陳水扁總統於2006年間宣佈終止「國家統一委員會」及「國家統一綱領」的適用，北京方面仍持續採用「和」、「戰」兩手策略，以強勢手段迫使台灣放棄主權獨立地位。惟兩岸政府在對彼此政權信心依舊不足的大前提下，短期內政治關係恐難有突破性的進展。
This study aims to analyze China’s strategies on Taiwan issue made from 1989 to 2004 with the “carrot-and-stick” dual strategies.
From 1942 to 1978, known as Mao’s establishment of regime to Deng Xiaoping’s returning to power, China’s policy toward Taiwan focuses on military attacks. Liberating Taiwan by military means was the main strategy, but peaceful means was not excluded. During post-Deng’s period, starting from late 1978 when Deng formally came to power on the 11th Central Committee Meeting to 1989 when Deng resigned his position as Chairmen of Central Military Commission after the Tiananmen incident, China set ‘Peaceful Unification and One Country, Two Systems’ as the main policy on Taiwan issue. It is also known as ‘Peaceful Unification’ period; military liberation of Taiwan was not excluded.
During Jiang Zemin period, China’s strategy toward Taiwan was to strengthen ‘Peaceful Unification and One Country, Two Systems’ policy, which declared that not acknowledging Taiwan as an equal political entity, and any of Taiwan’s self-defenses that may impede China’s interest should not be tolerated. Seemingly, Beijing authority claimed that China respected Taiwan people’s right, and was willing to push unification, but actually, China, relying on its military power, aimed to make Taiwan surrendered.
Faced with the first power rotation of Taiwan in 2000, Hu Jintao, the leader of China of forth generation and the Chairman of Central Military Committee. He pronounced Four Nos towards Taiwan: not to change the One China Policy, not to give up the pursuit of peaceful unification, not to change the expectation relying on Taiwan people, not to compromise on activities in support of Taiwan’s independence. Furthermore, China passed anti-secession law, firstly proposing three conditions definitely under which that non-peaceful means are allowed to deal with Taiwan. It is considered China’s bottom line towards Taiwan issue, showing that China feels great agitation towards the growing push from Taiwan independence.
To ease the internal backlash of Taiwan, and to respond to the international concern for anti-secession law, Hu invited Taiwan’s opposition parties-- KMT, PFP and New Party-- to pay a visit to China, molding atmosphere of civil interaction and political reconciliation. Beijing unilaterally declared no duties policy on Taiwan’s fruit import, but the official visit between the two governments are still in suspension.
In 2006, President Chen Shui-bian declared that both the National Unification Committee and the National Unification Guides are ceased to function. Beijing continues to apply ‘carrot-and-stick’ strategy, forcing Taiwan to give up its regime and independent status with powerful means. The two governments have no sufficient mutual trust, so there might be no breaking progress on the cross-strait relations. |
| Appears in Collections: | [Graduate Institute of China Studies] Thesis
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