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|Other Titles: ||Strategies on Taiwan issue, carrot-and-stick dual strategies, one country, two systems, anti-secession law|
|Authors: ||吳兆漢;Wu, Chao-han|
|Keywords: ||對台政策;和戰策略;一國兩制;反分裂國家法;Strategies on Taiwan Issue;Carrot-and-stick Dual Strategies;One Country;Two Systems;anti-secession law|
|Issue Date: ||2010-01-10 23:34:58 (UTC+8)|
This study aims to analyze China’s strategies on Taiwan issue made from 1989 to 2004 with the “carrot-and-stick” dual strategies.
From 1942 to 1978, known as Mao’s establishment of regime to Deng Xiaoping’s returning to power, China’s policy toward Taiwan focuses on military attacks. Liberating Taiwan by military means was the main strategy, but peaceful means was not excluded. During post-Deng’s period, starting from late 1978 when Deng formally came to power on the 11th Central Committee Meeting to 1989 when Deng resigned his position as Chairmen of Central Military Commission after the Tiananmen incident, China set ‘Peaceful Unification and One Country, Two Systems’ as the main policy on Taiwan issue. It is also known as ‘Peaceful Unification’ period; military liberation of Taiwan was not excluded.
During Jiang Zemin period, China’s strategy toward Taiwan was to strengthen ‘Peaceful Unification and One Country, Two Systems’ policy, which declared that not acknowledging Taiwan as an equal political entity, and any of Taiwan’s self-defenses that may impede China’s interest should not be tolerated. Seemingly, Beijing authority claimed that China respected Taiwan people’s right, and was willing to push unification, but actually, China, relying on its military power, aimed to make Taiwan surrendered.
Faced with the first power rotation of Taiwan in 2000, Hu Jintao, the leader of China of forth generation and the Chairman of Central Military Committee. He pronounced Four Nos towards Taiwan: not to change the One China Policy, not to give up the pursuit of peaceful unification, not to change the expectation relying on Taiwan people, not to compromise on activities in support of Taiwan’s independence. Furthermore, China passed anti-secession law, firstly proposing three conditions definitely under which that non-peaceful means are allowed to deal with Taiwan. It is considered China’s bottom line towards Taiwan issue, showing that China feels great agitation towards the growing push from Taiwan independence.
To ease the internal backlash of Taiwan, and to respond to the international concern for anti-secession law, Hu invited Taiwan’s opposition parties-- KMT, PFP and New Party-- to pay a visit to China, molding atmosphere of civil interaction and political reconciliation. Beijing unilaterally declared no duties policy on Taiwan’s fruit import, but the official visit between the two governments are still in suspension.
In 2006, President Chen Shui-bian declared that both the National Unification Committee and the National Unification Guides are ceased to function. Beijing continues to apply ‘carrot-and-stick’ strategy, forcing Taiwan to give up its regime and independent status with powerful means. The two governments have no sufficient mutual trust, so there might be no breaking progress on the cross-strait relations.
|Appears in Collections:||[Graduate Institute of China Studies] Thesis|
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