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    題名: 中國國有企業之公司治理研究 : 契約失效問題
    其他題名: The corporate governance research in the state-owned enterprises of China : contract failure
    作者: 陳柏奇;Chen, Po-chi
    貢獻者: 淡江大學中國大陸研究所碩士班
    李志強;Li, Chi-keung
    關鍵詞: 國有企業;公司治理;外部人控制;契約失效;state-owned enterprise;Corporate governance;exterior- controller;contract failure
    日期: 2005
    上傳時間: 2010-01-10 23:34:12 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究在中國國有企業邁向現代企業制度之公司治理的背景之下,以反思飛特與飛天兩集團之個案探討,解釋目前在外部人控制之下的國有企業契約失效問題乃在於制度環境的政企分離失效、法制法規失效、外部人控制下的責任體系失效及資訊不對稱下的監控失靈。

    其中,所探討之外部人控制問題是指利用直接或間接的權力,影響企業領導者做出不一定符合經營原則的決策;或是在產權非人格化的情況下,行使委託人權力的人向代理人施加壓力,使得尋租行為受到影響,而控制代理人的行為。
    透過運用契約理論中的委託代理、道德風險與逆選擇模型及尋租理論分析中國國有企業契約失效的問題,針對國有企業失效的具體表現形式及其產生的原因,提出「資產委託管理」方向,作為配合中國國有資產監督管理委員會設立的配套措施。本文研究成果與主要結論是:

    第一,整體中國國有企業治理的根本問題在於產權的不明晰,導致在所有權與控制權上的模糊不清,並且發生多重委託代理下的外部人尋租問題,致使其契約失效。在國有企業控股的情況下,上市公司的決定權仍然來自企業外部,即企業仍然由外部人控制。

    第二,圍繞國有企業委託代理的契約是一種集體契約,集體契約的各方都是組織而非個人,在契約各方的組織內,集體行為的邏輯,造成了契約的失效與監控的失靈。

    第三,國有企業的改革關鍵在於進行以人格化責任體系為中心的規則重新建構,以個人的契約來代替集體的契約。透過產權多元化的改革,建立以股東利益為上的責任體系。
    The major subject of this paper is the contract failures in the state-owned forms, taking the transformation of the corporate governance system into the "modern enterprise system" as a general background. This research will begin with the "above ten billion strategy" of several big manufacture group companies who was chosen to promote a rush growth of their annual sales into 10 billion Yuan individually during 5 years before the end of 2000. The strategy was sponsored and supported by the local government authority as apart of municipal economic development arrangement. The interference originated from such governmental behavior causes contract failure to state- owned enterprises and state- held public corporations. The whole research will be based on the sub-back-ground of the three- level framework of state- owned property management system in China. This paper is to reveal substantial fact that the mystery of such relationships is the rent- seeking of exterior controllers that brings about contract failures. Rent-seeking is the crucial institutional reason of contract failure in state-owned companies and in the state- held public corporations The case
    Study of "loan to stock" transformation on an imaginary model of such big companies, FEITE Group in S city, will be helpful for the exploration a outlet of rule restructure of state- owned enterprises.The theory of contracts, rent- seeking and public goods will be taken into the discussion as main theoretical tools. A contract rule restructure recommendation based on the institutional analysis of contract failure will be posed as part of the contribution of this paper.
    Following is the main contribution and conclusions:

    At first, exterior controller has a vital institutional environment composed of the failure of the division of enterprise from the governmental system, the inefficiency of the law and regulations and the shortage of responsibility system. It is in this institutional environment that the exterior controllers bring in contract failure into
    state-owned firms.

    Secondly, the organizational base on which the contracts go failure is that the contracts between governmental sections (as stockholder) and the management teams in state- owned firms are collective contracts. The participants are organizations instead of individual person. The logics of collective action makes the quality and the performance of contracts out of inspection and control. Meanwhile, the participants of the contract negotiation and performing will seek maximum personal utilities as possible as they can. The optimization of personal utilities upon collective contract will lead the contract to be a rent- seeking contract.

    At last, when part of the loaners transfer the loans into stocks in the debt companies, the ownership structures changed. To lead the reform into success, we should rebuild the rules with construction of a personalized responsibility system and keep the contracts as individual contracts instead of collective contracts. As the measure should be taken, the rent- seeking net must be broken, the channel of rent flow must be cut off, and the principle of market and law must be recalled. Accordingly, multi-stockholder system should be adopted to reform the ownership structure while priority of shareholder interest be employed to rebuild responsibility system.
    顯示於類別:[中國大陸研究所] 學位論文

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