|摘要: ||本論文自二ＯＯＯ年三一八總統大選至五二Ｏ政黨輪替開始，分析陳水扁總統的兩岸政策與兩岸定位論，並透過跨黨派小組成立以來密集的七次會議及獲得最後的「三個認知，四個建議」的共識，探討陳水扁總統亟盼經由跨黨派小組的集會獲致朝野的兩岸政策的原則性共識，緊接著剖析兩岸相繼於二ＯＯ一年底與二ＯＯ二年初分別加入世貿組織以來，對兩岸經貿關係的意涵與影響，以及中共對台政策與台灣的大陸政策之持續與變遷，甚至二者的互動對美「中」台關係的影響，最後闡述二ＯＯ四年臺灣大選後兩岸關係的演變與危機，先是從三二Ｏ後五二Ｏ前看美「中」台關係的危機，繼而分析五二Ｏ後美「中」台關係的演變，並且透過布希總統連任到布希與胡錦濤 APEC的高峰會看美「中」台關係，及探討中共制定並通過「反分裂國家法」對美「中」台關係的影響，尤其美國國務卿萊斯在中共完成「反分裂國家法」立法後訪問北京之意涵與影響，更不容加以輕忽。|
This thesis starts at the analysis on President Chen Shui-Bian’s Cross-Strait Policy and his positioning on the two sides of the Strait. Besides, by reviewing the 7 meetings since the “Cross-Party Committee” was set up and the final “3 recognitions, 4 suggestions” this committee had reached, this thesis also tries to discuss how urgent Present Chen was to look forward to a consensus in principle on Cross-Strait Policy through the meetings of the “Cross-party committee.” Then is an analysis on what it meant, as well as how it effected, to the Cross-Strait economic and trade relation that the both sides across the Strait joined WTO separately in the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, and also on the changes of China’s policy toward Taiwan and Taiwan’s toward China. And even more, how the interaction between the two affected the US-China-Taiwan relation. Later in this thesis is to explain the changes and crisis on Cross-Strait relation since Taiwan’s Presidential Election in 2004: started by reviewing the crisis on the US-China-Taiwan relation during March 20th and May 20th, and then analysis how the US-China-Taiwan relation changed after May 20th through discussing how the events including Bush’s being re-elected the USA president, the meeting between Bush and Hu Jintao at APEC Summit, as well as China’s enacting and adopting the “Anti Secession Law” effected the US-China-Taiwan relation, and especially the significance of Rice’s, the USA Secretary of State, visiting Beijing after China had enacted the “Anti Secession Law”and the momentous effect it might caused.
During the 5 years of his governance, President Chen Shui-Bian attempted to soften the intensive Cross-Strait relation by release his good will, but with no effect. The key point is Chen’s statement about the two sides. Though insisting “Five Nos” literally, he denied “1992 Consensus” once and again. More over, his related statements, from “a consensus without a consensus,” “1992 spirit,” to “one side, one country,” are eventually against the “Five Nos.” Even he devoted to seek for a consensus in principle among the ruling and the opposition parties on Cross-Strait Policy, the consensus reached by the “Cross-Party Committee” are still unable to decrease the differences between the ruling party and the opposition ones. Therefore, the Cross-Strait relation remains a stalemate and can hardly be broken through reopening the dialog between the two sides. On the other hand, the opposition parties and the ruling one contravene each other so sharply that can hardly be soothed by getting a consensus toward the Cross-Strait policy, not to say pacified. As a result, issues concerning the well beings of people, such as “3 direct links” and “Cross-Strait cooperation in cracking down crimes,” are still suspended and can not get a settlement through resuming the Cross-Strait dialogue. Then, after China enacted and adopted the “Anti Secession Law,” the Cross-Strait relation, and even the US-China-Taiwan relation, faced more severe tests and challenges.