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|Other Titles: ||Beijing's negotiating tactics against Taiwan based on '92 HK talks|
|Authors: ||陳天聲;Cheng Tien-sen|
|Keywords: ||中共;談判;談判的原則;談判的策略;China;Negotiations;principle of negotiations;strategies of negotiation|
|Issue Date: ||2010-01-10 23:26:16 (UTC+8)|
The political standoff between China and Taiwan has been going on for over 50 years since 1949. Sarcastically, European countries have broken away from the traditional concept of sovereignty state and successfully established an inter-state union at the end of the 20th century. People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait need to consider alternative options for peace rather than going to war. A win-win situation always requires continuous dialogues and negotiations.
The way Beijing authorities negotiate is based on Marx -Lenin theory, rooted on the Chinese culture, and utilize their tactics of united front. When negotiating, the Beijing authorities always make clear their button lines first, then force their opponents to accept. To avoid the negotiations from breaking down, their opponents have no choice but to make a concession. To the Chinese, achieving victory seems more important than solving problems.
Of all the cross-strait functional dialogues and negotiations, ’92 Hong-Kong talks is the most significant event, which was the only occasion where the issue of “one China” was discussed.
At that meeting, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) suggested that both sides interpret their own position on “one China”. However, the talks went into a deadlock as no consensus was reached on their respective interpretation.
Since it was unlikely to reach a consensus, the Taipei-based Mainland Affair Council authorized the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) to propose to the ARATS that “both sides adhere to its own position of one China and express it orally”. This is the so-called “one China, respective interpretations”.
The ARATS accepted the SEF’s proposal and agreed that how “one China” would be interpreted by both sides could be negotiated at a later time.
This is a significant event throughout the cross-strait interactions as China accepted Taiwan’s political offer for the first time.
Toady, the existence of “’92 consensus” is questioned by the Democratic Progressive Party government, which has already hurt the cross-strait relations. How to mend the relations can be a major event in the 21st century.
The true willingness by both governments to break the deadlock is the key to move cross-strait relations forward. Dialogues and negotiations are still the best way to improve relations.
Putting aside ideology and unilateral interests and replacing confrontation with dialogues are the only way to bring a positive hope to the cross-strait relations.
The author believes that: “one China” formula is the key to maintaining stability. Only following the “one China” policy can lead to peaceful competition.
|Appears in Collections:||[中國大陸研究所] 學位論文|
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