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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/25990

    Title: Must we know what we mean ?
    Authors: 鄭光明;Cheng, Kuang-ming
    Contributors: 淡江大學通識與核心課程中心
    Date: 2005-12-01
    Issue Date: 2009-12-15 12:38:21 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Kriterion
    Abstract: In his 1987 article “Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person”, John Searle argues that we actually know what we mean; therefore, W. V. O. Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation must be wrong. In this paper, I will try to identify the mistakes in Searle’s criticism of Quine’s story. I will argue that Quine’s indeterminacy thesis can be construed as containing two theses— that is, the immanent indeterminacy and the transcendent indeterminacy. With these two indeterminacies in mind, Quine’s indeterminacy thesis will still remain tenable even if we actually know what we mean
    Relation: Kriterion 19, pp.21-33
    Appears in Collections:[通識與核心課程中心] 期刊論文

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