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    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/25990

    題名: Must we know what we mean ?
    作者: 鄭光明;Cheng, Kuang-ming
    貢獻者: 淡江大學通識與核心課程中心
    日期: 2005-12
    上傳時間: 2009-12-15 12:38:21 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Kriterion
    摘要: In his 1987 article “Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person”, John Searle argues that we actually know what we mean; therefore, W. V. O. Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation must be wrong. In this paper, I will try to identify the mistakes in Searle’s criticism of Quine’s story. I will argue that Quine’s indeterminacy thesis can be construed as containing two theses— that is, the immanent indeterminacy and the transcendent indeterminacy. With these two indeterminacies in mind, Quine’s indeterminacy thesis will still remain tenable even if we actually know what we mean
    關聯: Kriterion 19, pp.21-33
    顯示於類別:[通識與核心課程中心] 期刊論文


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