The structure of authority, federalism, commitment and economic growth

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 經濟學系暨研究所 > 期刊論文 > Item 987654321/24775

請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/24775

題名:	The structure of authority, federalism, commitment and economic growth
作者:	艾德榮;Ronald Alan Edwards
貢獻者:	淡江大學經濟學系
關鍵詞:	Federalism;Institutions;Commitment;Time consistency;Growth theory;Game theory;Political economy
日期:	2005-04-01
上傳時間:	2009-11-30 18:36:35 (UTC+8)
出版者:	Springer
摘要:	In a neoclassical growth model with many regions and a mobile factor, two federal arrangements are considered. In the first federal arrangement the central government chooses a uniform tax policy, whereas in the second each regional government chooses its own tax policy. The main result is that the first federal arrangement leads to high tax rates and economic stagnation, whereas the second leads to low tax rates and economic growth. This result stems from a time consistency problem. The lack of tax competition forces a time consistency problem on the central government under the first federal arrangement. In contrast, regional tax competition acts as a commitment device under the second federal arrangement. The fundamental feature in the environment that gives rise to different abilities of the state to commit is the different structure of authority within the state.
關聯:	Economic Theory 25(3), pp.629-648
DOI:	10.1007/s00199-003-0457-1
顯示於類別:	[經濟學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

文件中的檔案:

檔案	大小	格式	瀏覽次數
	0Kb	Unknown	397	檢視/開啟
index.html	0Kb	HTML	115	檢視/開啟
The structure of authority, federalism, commitment and economic growth.pdf	181Kb	Adobe PDF	1	檢視/開啟

在機構典藏中所有的資料項目都受到原著作權保護.

TAIR相關文章