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    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/24775

    題名: The structure of authority, federalism, commitment and economic growth
    作者: 艾德榮;Ronald Alan Edwards
    貢獻者: 淡江大學經濟學系
    關鍵詞: Federalism;Institutions;Commitment;Time consistency;Growth theory;Game theory;Political economy
    日期: 2005-04-01
    上傳時間: 2009-11-30 18:36:35 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Springer
    摘要: In a neoclassical growth model with many regions and a mobile factor, two federal arrangements are considered. In the first federal arrangement the central government chooses a uniform tax policy, whereas in the second each regional government chooses its own tax policy. The main result is that the first federal arrangement leads to high tax rates and economic stagnation, whereas the second leads to low tax rates and economic growth. This result stems from a time consistency problem. The lack of tax competition forces a time consistency problem on the central government under the first federal arrangement. In contrast, regional tax competition acts as a commitment device under the second federal arrangement. The fundamental feature in the environment that gives rise to different abilities of the state to commit is the different structure of authority within the state.
    關聯: Economic Theory 25(3), pp.629-648
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0457-1
    顯示於類別:[經濟學系暨研究所] 期刊論文


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