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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/24775

    Title: The structure of authority, federalism, commitment and economic growth
    Authors: 艾德榮;Ronald Alan Edwards
    Contributors: 淡江大學經濟學系
    Keywords: Federalism;Institutions;Commitment;Time consistency;Growth theory;Game theory;Political economy
    Date: 2005-04-01
    Issue Date: 2009-11-30 18:36:35 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Springer
    Abstract: In a neoclassical growth model with many regions and a mobile factor, two federal arrangements are considered. In the first federal arrangement the central government chooses a uniform tax policy, whereas in the second each regional government chooses its own tax policy. The main result is that the first federal arrangement leads to high tax rates and economic stagnation, whereas the second leads to low tax rates and economic growth. This result stems from a time consistency problem. The lack of tax competition forces a time consistency problem on the central government under the first federal arrangement. In contrast, regional tax competition acts as a commitment device under the second federal arrangement. The fundamental feature in the environment that gives rise to different abilities of the state to commit is the different structure of authority within the state.
    Relation: Economic Theory 25(3), pp.629-648
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0457-1
    Appears in Collections:[經濟學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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