Welfare analysis of privatization in a mixed market with bargaining

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 經濟學系暨研究所 > 期刊論文 > Item 987654321/24774

jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/24774

题名:	Welfare analysis of privatization in a mixed market with bargaining
作者:	Jiang, Lily
贡献者:	淡江大學經濟學系
日期:	2006-07-01
上传时间:	2009-11-30 18:36:32 (UTC+8)
出版者:	Western Economic Association International
摘要:	The author analyzes the welfare effects of privatization in a mixed duopoly model in which the wage rate for the privatized firm is determined by Nash bargaining beforehand. The evaluations are based on three-stage privatization frameworks respectively under two regimes: Cournot competition and a public firm acting as a Stackelberg leader. The author finds that the optimal degrees of privatization from the viewpoint of social welfare may be different for various types of competition. The article also shows that even optimal privatization set by a welfare-maximization government may not guarantee welfare improvement, owing to the interference of wage bargaining.
關聯:	Contemporary Economic Policy 24(3), pp.395-406
DOI:	10.1093/cep/byj029
显示于类别:	[經濟學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

文件中的档案:

档案	大小	格式	浏览次数
	0Kb	Unknown	330	检视/开启
index.html	0Kb	HTML	54	检视/开启
Welfare analysis of privatization in a mixed market with bargaining.pdf	167Kb	Adobe PDF	0	检视/开启

在機構典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.

TAIR相关文章