淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/24405
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    题名: Optimal bank interest margin under the FDIC’s surveillance : a constrained option-based model
    作者: Lin, Jyh-horng;Chen, Li-li
    贡献者: 淡江大學國際貿易學系暨國際企業研究所
    日期: 2003
    上传时间: 2009-11-30 18:20:33 (UTC+8)
    出版者: New Delhi: TARU Publications
    摘要: This paper examines the relationships between the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) surveillance cost, optimal bank interest margin and deposit-amount determination. The framework utilized in this paper is the bank equity call option maximization subject to the put option of the FDIC’s risk-adjusted deposit insurance, explicitly considering surveillance cost. An increase in the FDIC’s surveillance cost results in an increased loan-rate setting and a reduced deposit-amount determination if the bank’s marginal market risky loans value is negative. Our findings provide an alternative explanation for the agency theory concerning a principal-agent issue of hidden action.
    關聯: Journal of statistics & management systems 6(3), pp.537-550
    DOI: 10.1080/09720510.2003.10701098
    显示于类别:[國際企業學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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