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    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/24398

    题名: Loan commitments, asymmetric information and capital regulation : an explanation for the synergy or narrow-banking management
    作者: Lin, Jyh-horng;Lii, Peirchyi;Chang, Chuen-ping
    贡献者: 淡江大學國際貿易學系暨國際企業研究所
    关键词: Banking;asymmetric information;capital requirement;loan commitment
    日期: 2005-03
    上传时间: 2009-11-30 18:20:17 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Analytic Publishing Co
    摘要: We use a two-stage option-based model to study how Asymmetric information, capital requirements, loan commitment rate and the optimal loan rate relate to one another under an uncertain loan loss source. This model shows that there will be synergies between lending and deposit-taking to the extent that both require the bank to hold large liquid asset balances if its term loans and loan commitments are substitutes. Otherwise, narrow banking management is required by the bank. However, if the bank's term loans and loan commitments are substitutes (complements) and the bank conducts strategic substitutes (strategic complements), there is also real narrow banking. Our findings provide an alternative explanation for the synergy or narrow banking management, which answer the question: if there is real synergy (narrow banking), a forced switch to narrow banking (synergy) could lead to a large inefficiency.
    關聯: Journal of Information & Optimization Sciences 26(1), pp.143-163
    DOI: 10.1080/02522667.2005.10699640
    显示于类别:[國際企業學系暨研究所] 期刊論文
    [管理科學學系暨研究所] 期刊論文


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