在實務上，進口國政府為了避免外籍廠商在投資設廠時使用劣等技術以致於其產 品在國際上禁不起競爭，常利用外銷比例政策來提升外籍廠商之技術水準。本文的目的在於 探討外銷比例政策是否真能促使外銷籍廠商提升技術水準。本文的研究結果發現：在外籍廠 商獨占本國市場的情況下，除非本國政府對外籍廠商所設的外銷比例不高，否則外銷比例政 策非但不會促使外籍廠商選擇較為優良的技術，反而會導致其採取較差的技術。當本國市場 有本國廠商參與競爭時，外銷比例對外籍廠商技術水準的影響除了受到前述比例值高低之影 響外，也受到市場策略性競爭效果的影響。當本國市場的需求函數為線性時，市場競爭的策 略性效果會使得外籍廠商在面對外銷比例提高時會選擇較差之技術。因此，一般而言，外銷 比例政策並無法確保外籍廠商會使用較高之技術水準。
It is common practice for developing countries to use an export-share requirement policy as a means of pushing investors from developed countries into adopting more superior technology. This paper sets out to explore whether this export-share requirement actually does have such an effect or not. It is found, in fact, that in the case of foreign-investor monopoly control of the domestic market, an export-share requirement policy often leads the foreign investor to adopt an inferior technology unless the export-share requirement is set at a sufficiently low level. In the case of duopoly where a domestic firm is competing with a foreign investor, the efficacy of the policy is dependent not only on the level at which the export-share is set but also on the strategic competition effect of the two firms. If the demand is linear, this strategic competition effect is negative, prompting the foreign investing firm to choose an inferior technology. It is concluded that an export-share requirement policy does not necessarily result in foreign firms employing superior technology.