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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/22157

    Title: 高階主管薪酬與績效衡量指標關聯性影響因素之研究
    Other Titles: The determinants of the relationship between CEO's compensation and performance measures
    Authors: 洪玉舜;王泰昌
    Contributors: 淡江大學會計學系
    Keywords: 高階主管薪酬;薪酬績效關聯性;公司特性;Executive compensation;Pay-performance sensitivity;Corporate characters
    Date: 2005-12
    Issue Date: 2009-11-30 13:55:36 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文之研究目的在於將高階主管(此指總經理)薪酬契約分別抽釐出現金與股票薪酬,探究會計、市場兩績效衡量對高階主管薪酬水準、結構(亦即探討現金、股票薪酬兩水準與相對比例)之相對重要性是否受到公司特性(包含公司成長機會、規模、風險、及槓桿程度)之影響。實證結果發現公司特性之情境因素對於會計、市場兩績效衡量在高階主管薪酬契約中之相對有用性之影響,的確會因不同薪酬制度而有所變化。如公司風險方面,顯示當環境不確定性愈高時,高階主管薪酬(不論股票或現金薪酬)與市場績效指標之正關聯性顯著降低,而其薪酬與會計績效指標之正關聯性顯著提升,說明當環境不確定性愈高時,高階主管相對上較顧慮風險(相對於誘因)之因素,此時公司應降低外部績效(如市場績效)與薪酬之連結,而以內部績效(會計績效)之連結予以替代。並且當公司風險愈大時,高階主管股票薪酬與會計績效指標間正關聯性之提升幅度大於現金薪酬與會計績效指標間正關聯性之提升幅度,而高階主管股票薪酬與市場績效指標間正關聯性之下降幅度大於現金薪酬與市場績效指標間正關聯性之下降幅度。因此,當公司在設計高階主管薪酬契約時,應就不同薪酬制度與重要情境因素間之連結作全盤考量,才能發揮績效衡量指標在高階主管薪酬契約中之功能。
    The purpose of this paper is to separate stock-based compensation from cash compensation in CEO's total remuneration contracts. We would like to investigate whether the relative uses of accounting and market performance measures in executive compensation contracts (including cash- and stock-based compensation) would be affected by the corporate characters (e.g. the growth opportunity of the corporate, the size of the corporate, the corporate risk, and the leverage ratio of the corporate). The result of the paper shows that the corporate characters, having impacts on the relative uses of accounting and market performance measures in executive compensation contracts, indeed would vary with different compensation systems. As a result, while contracting CEO's compensation, the board of the firm needs whollyto consider those significant factors so as to improve the efficiencies of the governance roles of firm performance measures in CEO's compensation.
    Relation: 台灣財務金融學會年會暨財務金融保險不動產學術研討會論文集=Proceedings of 2006 Annual Conference of TFA on Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate,47頁
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系暨研究所] 會議論文

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