Forsyth (1980) 提出理想主義與相對主義用以解釋個人之道德判斷，而架構效應(framing effect) 與順序效應 (order effect) 係心理學家提出個人處理資訊之兩個重要認知特性。本研究由兩實驗組成，分以考試作弊與盈餘管理為道德判斷情境，探討個人道德意識與認知特性對道德判斷之影響：一、實驗一發現，在不同道德判斷情境下，均證實道德意識對道德判斷具有顯著之影響，且高理想主義者（低相對主義者）對道德議題之判斷較低理想主義者（高相對主義者）為嚴格。對於相同經濟意義之資訊，以不同之陳述方式對道德判斷呈現顯著之影響，而以不同之資訊陳述順序，受試者對舉發作弊意願（贊同盈餘管理程度）呈現顯著之時近效應，即採先有利後不利之陳述順序者，其舉發作弊意願（贊同盈餘管理程度）會顯著高（低）於採先不利後有利之陳述順序者。二、實驗二發現，高理想主義者（低相對主義者）對道德議題之判斷較低理想主義者（高相對主義者）為嚴格。而不同之資訊陳述方式雖未對道德判斷呈現顯著之影響，但信念調整之方向與幅度，均符合預期，而不同之資訊陳述順序亦對道德判斷呈現顯著之影響。本研究以道德意識出發，並結合心理學家提出人類處理資訊之兩個重要認知特性，以期提出更接近真實世界情境之研究貢獻。 Recent research has supported Forsyth's study conclusions about the taxonomy of ethical ideology: (1) Relativism, (2) Idealism in 1980. The typology of ethical ideologies explains this variation by suggesting that in general people take particular stances regarding ethics and that the position taken will influence the judgment reached. Psychologist suggested that framing effect and order effect can explain the cognitive bias on decisions. Experiment one and two respectively have 119 and 142 students as experimenters, which discuss the influence of ethical ideology and cognitive bias on moral judgment. Results indicate that: (1). Experiment one finds that ethical ideology have significantly different from moral judgments. Idealist (non-relativist) exhibits higher ethical standards for moral judgments than non-idealist (relativist). It also demonstrated that the moral judgments were influenced by framing effect and order effect. (2). Experiment two finds that idealist, non-idealist, relativist and non-relativist have different moral judgments. The order in which information is received that it is a recency effect occurs. Although these observation do not imply that the moral judgments were influenced by framing effect, but the belief-adjustments of experimenters were consistent with our anticipation. The study outlines the possible explanations for the moral judgments that influenced by cognitive bias and contribute to the empirical evidences were more complied with reality.